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the key drivers of outcomes, whether the rates of mass incarceration or the
degree of racial disparities in justice. To date, there is precious little
empirical research on how prosecutors exercise their breathtaking
discretion. We do not know whether they consistently charge like cases alike
or whether crime is in the eye of the beholder. We do not know what sorts
of limits, supervision, or guidelines prosecutors work within. And we do not
know what types of information prosecutors rely upon when making their
decisions. Prosecutors’ decisions have accordingly been called a “black box”
for their inscrutability.
Until now. We recruited over 500 prosecutors nationwide, and had them
charge an identical case given identical substantive law, specify the plea
bargain terms they would seek, and explain their decisions. We also learned
about their internal office guidelines and procedures, and the information
they rely upon when making charging and bargaining decisions.
Our study tells a story of surprising severity in how prosecutors dispose
of a relatively mild case with no harm to victims, creating potentially
devastating consequences for an offender suffering from apparent mental
illness. Taking advantage of our vignette-survey design, which presents the
exact same case to hundreds of prosecutors, we also document wild
heterogeneity in prosecutor charging practices, with some dismissing the
case out of hand and others demanding months or years of incarceration.
We also find that many prosecutors lack meaningful guidelines or
supervision. Nonetheless, in our review of their qualitative explanations, we
also find prosecutors aspiring to do justice, concerned about harm to victims
and the rehabilitation of offenders, and considering the offender’s mental
health and financial wherewithal. From these findings, we shed light in an
otherwise theoretically rich but empirically lacking area of criminal
scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors have extensive power and what guides their decisions is
largely unknown and inscrutable.1 There is an ongoing national
conversation about the role of prosecutors in increasing and potentially
reducing national incarceration rates,2 as well as their role in
1 See Chad Flanders & Stephen Galoob, Progressive Prosecution in a Pandemic, 110
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685, 690 (2020) (“[T]he power and discretion of
prosecutors . . . could be wielded either for harsh justice or for mercy and leniency.”);
Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and Their State and Local Polities, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 823, 825 (2020) (“[A] prosecutor’s declination policy is a matter of debate
with the prosecutor’s office, among other lawyers, and with the larger voting public.”).
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Expanding the Reach of Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707, 707-09 (2020) (describing how societal pressures have led to
the rise of progressive prosecutors to address the failings of mass incarceration and
recidivism).
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contributing to incarceration disparities that harm people of color.3
Some scholars have focused on the rise of newly-elected prosecutors
articulating progressive visions,4 intimating that progressive
prosecution has swept a wave over the nation.5 However, it is unclear
whether isolated progressive statements from head prosecutors
translate into meaningful leniency from line prosecutors. Indeed,
prosecutor decision making, including what factors they consider in
charging and plea bargaining, has been referred to as the “black box.”6
This is protected information that is not discoverable by defendants and
has been difficult to examine empirically.7

3 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive
Law Enforcers Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719, 752 (2020)
(“[Progressive prosecutors] attempt to minimize racial and economic injustice,
exemplified by high rates of incarceration, particularly of poor people and minorities.”).
4 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 2, at 707-11 (attributing the rise of progressive
prosecutors to increased public recognition that mass incarceration is a problem, a
“gradual downward trend in crime,” and the unique role district attorneys play in the
criminal justice system); Flanders & Galoob, supra note 1, at 688-94 (describing
progressive prosecutors’ focus on reducing mass incarceration, using alternative
institutions such as specialty courts, and emphasizing treating all actors with respect);
see also Rachel E. Barkow, Can Prosecutors End Mass Incarceration?, 119 MICH. L. REV.
1365, 1375 (2021) (highlighting that progressive prosecutors face challenges to getting
elected, even in urban, liberal areas).
5 Kim Foxx was elected State’s Attorney for Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) in
2016; Larry Krasner was elected District Attorney of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in
2017; Rachael Rollins was elected District Attorney of Suffolk County, Massachusetts
(Boston) in 2018. See Caren Morrison, Progressive Prosecutors Scored Big Wins in 2020
Elections, Boosting a Nationwide Trend, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 18, 2020, 8:22 AM
EST), https://theconversation.com/progressive-prosecutors-scored-big-wins-in-2020elections-boosting-a-nationwide-trend-149322 [https://perma.cc/ATX4-S7ZF]; see also
Cara Bayles, A New Class of Prosecutors: Reformers Win Races Nationwide, LAW360 (Nov.
8, 2020, 8:02 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/access-to-justice/articles/1326594/anew-class-of-prosecutors-reformers-win-races-nationwide [https://perma.cc/ZX6Y-KQLL]
(“Progressive newcomers were elected to top prosecutor posts in Los Angeles; Austin,
Texas; Orlando, Florida; Detroit; Aurora, Colorado; and Columbus, Ohio; as well as
what were considered local presidential battlegrounds, like Michigan’s Oakland
County, a suburb of Detroit.”).
6 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129
(2008) (“[T]he black box: the inner workings of prosecutors’ offices. . . . [T]he absence
of controlling statutes or case law makes it possible for prosecutors to do their daily
work without explaining their choices to the public.”).
7 See Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass
Incarceration, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 124-32 (2022) (noting the lack of up-to-date
empirical research on prosecutorial decisions).
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Prosecutors play a key role in the administration of criminal justice.8
Prosecutors decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings,9 what
charges to bring,10 what penalties to seek,11 whether to agree to a plea

8 See Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines
for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 475 (2007); Robert L. Misner,
Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 776 (1996);
George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2005); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (1981).
9 See generally Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1700 (2010) (“Once police have
made arrests, it falls to prosecutors to . . . determine equitably in which cases to decline
prosecution.”); Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4-5
(2017) (concluding that determining whether or not to bring charges is the most
significant aspect of a prosecutor’s discretion); Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs:
Considering Pressure on White-Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 868 (2009)
(“Prosecutors in street-crime cases have a great deal of discretion as to whether or not
to indict.”).
10 See generally Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L.
REV. 69, 84 (2011) (noting that because prosecutors do not have sufficient resources to
raise all possible charges, they must exercise discretion in choosing what charges to
bring); Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 710 (2014) (describing
critiques of prosecutors’ ability to decide what charges to bring in the over- or
disproportionate charging context); Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of
Legitimacy in Criminal Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015) (describing
prosecutors’ abilities to file charges and add unlimited enhancements after the initial
charge is filed); Craig H. Solomon, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: Divergent Lower Court
Applications of the Due Process Prohibition, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (1982)
(“Prosecutors enjoy considerable discretion in deciding what charges, if any, to bring
against a suspect.”).
11 See generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel
Policies and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53,
53 (2012) (“The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment
are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured.”); Peter L.
Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97
B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017) (“Prosecutorial discretion is most commonly conceived of
in the criminal context, wherein prosecutors routinely make determinations about . . .
how vigorously to pursue [cases] . . . .”).
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bargain,12 and what sentencing recommendations to advise.13 The
prosecutor may be the government official with the most unreviewable
power and discretion.14 Since the vast majority of cases are resolved
short of trial, a second key point of attention is plea bargaining, which
prosecutors also control.

12 See generally Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 599 (2014)
(“Prosecutors also have the power to decide not to make a plea offer.”); Michael M.
O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 425-26 (2008)
(describing the significant leverage prosecutors have when making plea bargains);
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471,
1472 (1993) (noting the “substantial power” prosecutors have “to overwhelm criminal
defendants in the plea bargaining process”); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 (2002) (“Negotiated pleas are
currently the rule.”).
13 See generally Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1071, 1091 (2017) (“[I]ndividual prosecutors retain a wide degree of
discretion and little accountability to fulfill broader executive directives or guidance.”);
Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors:
Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 399 (2009) (noting that prosecutors hold
significant sentencing power both in jurisdictions with determinate sentencing schemes
and jurisdictions with indeterminate sentencing schemes); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42
UCLA L. REV. 105, 107 (1994) (“Recent increases in prosecutorial discretion in the
sentencing arena represent the latest expansion of this discretion.”); O’Hear, supra note
12, at 425 (“[T]he proliferation of sentencing guidelines . . . has given prosecutors even
greater leverage over defendants than they have traditionally enjoyed.); Kate Stith, The
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J.
1420, 1470 (2008) (describing how prosecutors have discretion to interpret federal
sentencing guidelines); Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1521 (“The decisions [prosecutors]
make determine in large part . . . what punishment will be imposed.”); Ronald F.
Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011 (2005) (describing how prosecutors have more sentencing
power than judges); Nicole T. Amsler, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal
Corporate Charging Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 173 (2016)
(describing how the implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines gave federal
prosecutors more discretion in criminal sentencing).
14 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 959 (2009); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in
Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 35 (1994) (arguing that the Racial Justice Act should curb prosecutorial discretion
in seeking the death penalty).
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Prosecutors’ wide discretion creates opportunity for racial and gender
bias,15 overcharging,16 vindictiveness,17 plea bargaining abuses,18 and
wrongful convictions.19 However, prosecutorial discretion allows
prosecutors to adapt to different scenarios involving unique facts and
defendants, and provides a way for prosecutors to manage their evergrowing caseloads through plea-bargaining.20 Arguably, prosecutorial
discretion puts decision making in the hands of those with institutional
knowledge of the criminal justice system. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice
process, [we would demand] exceptionally clear proof before [we]
w[ould] infer that the discretion has been abused.”21
15 See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011) (“Prosecutor Konat
injected racial prejudice into the trial proceedings by asserting that [B]lack witnesses
are unreliable . . . .”); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1588-92 (2006); The Mo.
Task Force on Gender & Just., Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice,
58 MO. L. REV. 485, 506 (1993) (explaining that prosecutors may not prioritize domestic
violence cases because prosecutors “lack understanding, sensitivity, and training” and
“may not believe female victims”); see also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 774
(1st Cir. 1995) (“[C]ourts must not tolerate prosecutors’ efforts gratuitously to inject
issues like race and ethnicity into criminal trials.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s
D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420 (2009)
(“[R]acially-skewed outcomes . . . cannot occur without prosecutorial support.”).
16 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 85-105 (1968); see also H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The
Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2011) (applying
game theory to overcharging); Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 32 (arguing for a hard
screening system to prevent prosecutorial overcharging).
17 See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
18 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (holding that threatening
the death penalty to force defendant to plead guilty to a lesser murder charge was not
coercive); United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 444 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (holding that, though extended pre-trial incarceration caused defendant’s
physical and mental health to deteriorate, a plea bargain was acceptable despite the
danger of due process violations by the intensive pressure on defendant to plead guilty).
19 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403
(discussing one study showing that, out of 62 persons exonerated by DNA evidence,
prosecutorial misconduct played a role in twenty-six of those wrongful convictions);
see also Baughman, supra note 13, at 1110-11; Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291
(2006).
20 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (2000) (arguing
that a crushing workload and increased caseloads explain why prosecutors began to
choose to plea bargain and why they continue to do so today).
21 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987).
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Nonetheless, many legal scholars argue that the unchecked power of
prosecutorial discretion is too broad.22 Legal commentators have
characterized prosecutorial discretion as a “dangerous”23 and
“tyrannical”24 decision-making process because it is “unreviewed and
its justifications unarticulated.”25 Others have claimed that
prosecutorial discretion is the single largest cause of mass incarceration
and is responsible for the expansive growth in felony convictions since
the 1970s.26

22 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (2011)
(“[P]rosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given its invisibility, barely checked
by politics.”); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2150 (2013) (“The U.S. criminal
system is not truly adversarial because prosecutors possess broad, unchecked power
and therefore determine results in criminal cases with little or no input from the
defense.”); see Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (“There are currently
no effective legal checks in place . . . . In a government whose hallmark is supposed to
be the separation of powers, federal prosecutors are a glaring and dangerous
exception.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1049 (2006) (similar); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American
Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2014) (“[U]unfettered prosecutorial
discretion and the ‘relative absence of efforts to standardize and regulate charging
practices’ lead to arbitrary charging decisions, often with an outsized impact on
minorities and the poor.”).
23 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5
(1940); see also Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 40809 (1992) (“Uncontrolled discretion . . . has the potential for abuse. In the hands of
prosecutors, this potential is now a reality.”).
24 Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting); see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 399 (2001) (“The current constitutional
design is dysfunctional as a check on prosecutorial power.”).
25 Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1073 (1972); see also Leonetti,
supra note 11, at 55 (“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail
when mixed with invidious forms of prosecutorial conduct.”).
26 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 127 (2017) (“Recall that over the 1990s and 2000s . . . even
as the number of arrests declined, the number of felony cases filed in state courts rose
sharply. In the end, the probability that a prosecutor would file felony charges against
an arrestee basically doubled, and that change pushed prison populations up even as
crime dropped.”); Barkow, supra note 4, at 1393 (“Mass incarceration is driven by two
factors: the number of cases coming into the system (admissions) and the length of
sentences. Prosecutors have discretion to change the rate of admissions, and for cases
going forward, they can also influence sentences based on the charges they bring and
the sentences they request (or accept in pleas).”); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro
Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1237, 1240 (2012) (concluding that
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One troubling aspect of unbridled prosecutorial discretion is that it
renders inconsistent results with defendants receiving widely varying
treatment for similar crimes.27 As a result, the public is unsure if the
prosecutor has a reasonable explanation for the apparent inconsistent
decision or if she is abusing her power or demonstrating bias.28
Questions about the consistency and fairness of prosecutorial decisions
motivate this study.
There is currently no experimental evidence in the field comparing
how prosecutors nationally charge a case with similar facts. While this
evidence does not yet exist, this Article provides the next best thing:
insight into how prosecutors wish they could charge a case. It also
provides insight into what limits a prosecutor in charging, what
guidelines they are required to follow, and what prosecutors claim they
consider when charging a case.
This Article explores prosecutors’ discretion, specifically their
discretion in the initial charging decision. The first point of contact with
a prosecutor is the decision to charge a defendant with a crime.
Prosecutor discretion in the charging decision is important to study
because it may reduce the efficacy of downstream policy reforms, such
as sentencing guidelines, which have been enacted to reduce disparities
in outcomes.29
In this Article, we present results from an original empirical study of
prosecutor decision making in order to better understand the “black
box” of prosecutor discretion. We surveyed hundreds of prosecutors
about how they make charging decisions, and we also presented them
with a hypothetical case and asked for their charging and punishment
recommendations. Our results demonstrate significant variability in
prosecutors are the “who” behind prison growth in the United States due to the number
of felony filings per arrest).
27 Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1537; see Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial
Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2001); cf. Bibas, supra note 14, at 978 (“Moreover,
legislatures have strong incentives to err on the side of overbroad statutes, rather than
risk hobbling prosecutors . . . .”).
28 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 945-46 (2006).
29 See Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and
Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2012) (“[Sentencing] commissions could and
should do more to address the relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power
. . . [b]ecause some amount of prosecutorial discretion is necessary and inevitable.”);
see also Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 447, 483 (2016); Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing
Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 221
(2005).
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prosecutor decision making, especially by geographic region, perhaps
because many of our respondents work in offices that do not have
internal guidelines or standards that constrain discretion. Our results
also illuminate the process of prosecutor decision making, including
factors they claim are important to their decision.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews prior research on
prosecutor decision making, including variability in charging, severity
in charging, national and local guidance, and the factors that
prosecutors rely upon in making decisions. Part II describes our
empirical approach, including the methods for recruiting prosecutors,
collecting data, and analyzing the data. Part III lays out our findings,
including the heterogeneity in charges and penalties assessed, the
prosecutors’ reasons for their decisions, the use of guidelines or
standards, and the information they relied upon. Part IV provides a
discussion, identifying directions for reform and further research.
I.

REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH ON PROSECUTOR DECISION MAKING

While fairness and justice critiques of prosecutors are plentiful,30
there has not been a focus in the scholarship on the variability of
prosecutor charging or concerns about severity of charging by
prosecutors. One of the reasons for this is because we lack national data
on how prosecutors’ charging varies across the country. While
individual prosecutors have been critiqued for severity,31 there has not
been national evidence to study whether prosecutors as a group are
charging appropriately. This Part reviews the literature on variability
and severity in prosecutor charging decisions and sentencing
recommendations. It then explains the constraints on prosecutor
discretion, namely the role of professional or office level guidelines. And
finally, it reviews the literature discussing the factors relevant to
prosecutors’ decisions.

30 See Bibas, supra note 14, at 978 (“The deeper problem is that systemic patterns
of charging and plea bargaining, influenced by self-interest, bias, and other
considerations, may undercut equality and equity.”); Leonetti, supra note 11, at 55
(“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail when mixed with
invidious forms of prosecutorial conduct.”); Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1537
(“[P]rosecutors’ actions can determine who gets twenty years and who gets a year or
two or probation for essentially the same conduct.”).
31 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for Sentences Called Harsh, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/us/federal-prosecutorsassailed-in-outcry-over-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/87YZ-658D] (describing
how prosecutors offered defendant either life without parole if found guilty of
“trafficking one kilogram of heroin” or “sentence of 10 years” with guilty plea).
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A. Variability in Prosecutor Charging
There are few explicit bars to prosecutor variability in charging,
including from the Constitution, statutes, or national prosecutor
bodies. Some scholars have even argued that consistency across
prosecutorial decisions should not be the goal; rather, we should strive
towards a system where there are “roughly equivalent probabilities of
receiving some favorable result.”32 As compared to criminal justice
systems in Europe, uniformity is a less articulated priority in the U.S.
criminal justice system.33 However there are some articulated standards
warning against variability in prosecutor charging. The Constitution
limits variability on prosecutor charging only where concerns of race,
religion, or another arbitrary classification are raised.34 The American
Bar Association (“ABA”) cautions against “unwarranted disparate
treatment of similarly situated persons,” but does so by listing it as only
one of many factors to be considered in any case.35 Likewise, the
commentary to the National District Attorneys Association (“NDAA”)
standards highlight the importance of “uniformity,” stating that “the
goal of uniformity protects a victim or accused from receiving
substantially different treatment because the case was assigned to one
individual in the office and not to another.”36 In addition, when
considering charges, the NDAA standards list “charging decisions made
for similarly-situated defendants” as one factor that “may be
considered.”37
Robust studies of prosecutor variability in charging do not exist,
although one survey of forty-three Wisconsin district attorneys showed
significant variability in charging decisions.38 Variability in charging
decisions is difficult to study in part because “courts have limited
authority to review [charging and plea bargaining] decisions and

32

Bowers, supra note 9, at 1677.
See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States:
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1325, 1346 (1993) (citing the variability in jury decisions as one example).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (noting that
prosecutor charging variability presents a problem where deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification).
35 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a)(ix) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017).
36 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-5.4 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
37 Id. § 4-1.3(i).
38 Kim Banks Mayer, Comment, Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District
Attorneys: Can Charging Guidelines Promote Public Awareness?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295, 299.
33
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identify and remedy abuses.”39 Experts have recognized that “[i]n
practice . . . the exercise of discretion varies considerably among
offices.”40
Office structure may play a role in charging variability, and overall
the more centralized charging practices, the less variability between
prosecutors. For example, Ron Wright and Marc Miller examined the
actions taken in New Orleans to “ensure reasonable uniformity in
screening decisions.”41 In another study, Ron Wright and Kay Levine
conducted interviews with forty-two misdemeanor and drug
prosecutors in the Southeast, finding one recurring theme: “the need
for consistency among different prosecutors who work in the same
office.”42 Wright and Levine theorized that there was a “correlation
between social architecture and consistency”: the more hierarchical the
office, the greater emphasis on consistency.43 Stephanos Bibas has also
asserted that “hierarchy and centralization improve consistent,
accountable application of rules.”44 Specifically, creating “[c]entralized
39 Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 58-59 (2016) (citing United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296,
1299-300 (9th Cir. 1991)).
40 Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public
Accountability: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 11 (Harv. Kennedy Sch.,
Working Paper #00-02-04, 2000), https://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/
2015/1545/community_prosecutioncolles2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEK2-HC5X].
41 Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 62-66. Wright and Miller discuss numerous
structural changes aimed at achieving more uniformity, including assigning the role of
screening to senior trial attorneys, tracking data on the reasons for each decision in the
process to try to ensure consistency even with the high staff turnover, assigning some
types of cases “to screeners with special expertise” (for example, grouping by drug cases,
ordinary cases, homicides, and rapes), and having the screener interview key witnesses
and victims and sometimes the officer as well. Id. at 62-63, 66. There were also some
procedural changes made through office policies: “charg[ing] the most serious crime
the facts will support at trial,” requiring that “the charges chosen for the information
. . . stay in place through the trial” to address overcharging, supervisory review of all
refusals to charge, discouraging refusal to charge specific types of crime (like domestic
violence), requiring that “[a] supervisor . . . approve any decision to drop or change
charges after the information is filed,” and creating “a ‘stigma’ . . . in reducing charges.”
Id. at 63-64. Wright and Miller also note that the New Orleans office also declines to
prosecute a large number of cases to encourage “police officers to investigate more
thoroughly.” Id. at 65.
42 Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1171 (2012).
43 Id.
44 Bibas, supra note 14, at 1005 (citing Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination
and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2062-73 (2006)). In the plea bargaining
context, offices with less hierarchical structures had greater variability between
prosecutors’ decisions within the office than in offices that placed greater emphasis on
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charging units” has been theorized to decrease variability by reducing
the temptation to “overcharge[] weak cases so that they can later
charge-bargain them away.”45 Others have theorized that variability
may be a result of a lack of office-wide policies or reliance on “unitspecific policy making.”46 When chief prosecutors “rel[y] on unit
managers to translate their philosophy into policies,” managers may
vary in their approaches, “creating opportunities for inconsistencies
across units and over time.”47 Overall the lack of office policies in
charging or a centralized charging unit has been theorized to cause
variability in prosecutor charging.
Most of the controls on prosecutor charging are imposed informally
due to social norms, although prosecutors maintain considerable
discretion. According to Marc Miller and Ron Wright, outside of formal
rules, social norms can create rules within a prosecutor’s office that
constrain and regulate the discretion of individual prosecutors.48 These
norms are in no way articulated in any organized manner.49 Some
experts have recommended that prosecutors should have some informal
controls that ensure consistency in charging and plea bargaining within
an office.50 Though without written standards, “it is only natural that
there will be a lack of uniformity in filing decisions and a breakdown in
the implementation of prosecutor’s decisions.”51 Josh Bowers has
recognized that discretion will always seep into prosecutor enforcement
“professionalism” and enforcement of clear policies. See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT
JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 85-86, 11617, 146-54 (1977) (comparing plea bargaining discretion and organizational structures
in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit).
45 Bibas, supra note 14, at 1001; see also Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 61-82
(finding that plea bargaining in New Orleans was reduced when centralized screening
processes were implemented).
46 Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 72 (2013).
47 Id. at 71-72 (2013) (“Allowing unit-specific policies and norms to develop may
result in simple differences in attitudes about the appropriate sentence recommended
in a plea offer or it may result in major, fundamental differences in the overall approach
to evaluating cases.”).
48 Miller & Wright, supra note 6, at 178; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840 (“[P]rosecutors should
make decisions based on articulable principles or subprinciples that command broad
societal acceptance.”).
49 Green & Zacharias, supra note 48, at 840 (“[P]rosecutors have never, either
individually or collectively, undertaken the task of identifying workable norms for the
array of discretionary decisions that their offices make each day.”).
50 Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1345.
51 Norman Maleng, Charging and Sentencing: Where Prosecutors’ Guidelines Help
Both Sides, 1 CRIM. JUST. 6, 41 (1987).
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of the law, despite the desire to reach consistency.52 But greater
transparency may provide more motivation toward consistency in
decision making and “can help stakeholders to monitor prosecutors’
performance and to push for more concrete policies.”53 While
uniformity in charging is not a requirement for prosecutors, some
scholars have argued that greater transparency in prosecutor decisions
or centralized decision making may help reduce variability or improper
prosecutor motives.
B. Severity in Charging Decisions
There is little in the way of national or local guidance on the severity
of charges prosecutors bring for any particular set of alleged facts. ABA
guidance on the severity of charges is limited to encouraging
prosecutors to “act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase
public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of
appropriate severity,” and by using their “discretion to not pursue
criminal charges in appropriate circumstances.”54 NDAA guidance is
similarly abstract, encouraging prosecutors to file charges that the
prosecutor “believes adequately encompass the accused’s criminal
activity” and that they “reasonably believe[] can be substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial.”55 There is no national admonition to limit
prosecutor charging when there is discretion to do so. Indeed, there are
some obvious examples of explicit guidance or informal rules
advocating for charging the most serious crimes available. For example,
the U.S. Attorney Manual states that a Federal prosecutor should
initially charge “the most serious, readily provable offenses” consistent
with the defendant’s conduct.56 Some members of the Supreme Court
in recent years indicated that a Justice Department policy of charging
52

See Bowers, supra note 9, at 1676.
Bibas, supra note 14, at 1007.
54 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
55 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.2 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
56 JUST. MANUAL § 9-27.300 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution [https://perma.cc/B66B-7EBE]; see also
Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Off. of the Att’y Gen., Department Charging and
Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
965896/download [https://perma.cc/DK5A-BJJ5] (“[I]t is a core principle that
prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.”). But
see Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal
Defendants, to all federal prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/
opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm [https://perma.cc/H43A-M8C3] (“[C]harges
should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea.”).
53
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the most severe offense as a general rule raises serious concerns.57 Still,
this federal policy has not been overturned.
Research has suggested that junior prosecutors are more likely to
bring the most severe charges, for a variety of reasons. One public
defender argues that the decision by new prosecutors to pursue the
maximum charges “comes from a fear of mistakes, of making the wrong
judgment call about a stranger, of granting leniency when the recipient
may disappoint by committing another crime[,] . . . of being made a fool
by some sly defendant, or duped by some defense attorney, or being
called soft on crime.”58 Wright and Levine have found in their studies
of prosecutors that young prosecutors may consider themselves
“superheroes, ready to try any case on the docket” while more seasoned
prosecutors think of themselves as “arbitrators, negotiators, ‘BS meters,’
and advocates.”59 Their research has found that prosecutors with less
experience were more likely “to ignore the human dimension of many
cases, approaching each file with a standardized view, focusing on the
need to punish everyone.”60 As such, inexperience made prosecutors
less likely to dismiss charges and more likely to closely follow the most
obvious charges available in statutes.61 In addition, in interviews,
“[e]ntry-level and junior prosecutors were more likely than their
experienced colleagues to say that it is important to stick with the most
serious charges during plea negotiations.”62
The plea-bargaining process may also play a role in the severity of
initial charging decisions. Some evidence exists that prosecutors charge
aggressively to allow for a lesser plea.63 For instance, in Alafair Burke’s
57 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-32, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(2015) (No. 13-7451). Justice Scalia stated, in response to such a rule, “I’m going to be
very careful about how severe I make statutes . . . or how much coverage I give to severe
statutes.” Id. at 29. Chief Justice Roberts also stated that such a policy could give
“extraordinary leverage . . . [to] Federal prosecutors” if the statute were to cover the
alleged criminal behavior in that particular case. Id. at 31.
58 Fan Li, Youthful Indiscretion: The Structural Challenge of Inexperienced Prosecutors,
in CAN THEY DO THAT? UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 1, 115 (Melba V.
Pearson ed., 2020).
59 Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1126 (2014).
60 Id. at 1084.
61 See id. at 1084-85.
62 Id. at 1087-88.
63 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 16, at 98 (arguing that more severe charging
decisions are incentivized by plea bargaining); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion,
Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 201-02 (2007) (describing
how prosecutors can “anchor” on preliminary decisions and then “inadequately adjust”
from that initial anchor); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea-Bargaining as a Social
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study, one prosecutor stated that he would “charge aggressively to allow
for a plea to a lesser offense.”64 The charging decision is closely tied to
plea bargaining, which may begin even before formal charges are filed.65
Notably, NDAA’s “National Prosecution Standards do not include any
restriction on filing charges to obtain plea bargaining leverage.”66
The line between overcharging and proper severity is unclear.
Charging the highest provable offense may be seen as overcharging by
some while considered fair by others. Jeffrey Bellin is in the latter camp
as he recently argued that overcharging should be defined as charging a
defendant with an offense that is not “readily provable” or an offense
for which the jury should not convict.”67 But on the other side, Bruce
Green argues “that people who commit crimes should not necessarily
be punished as harshly as the law permits.”68 The recent scholarly focus
on progressive prosecution has discouraged severe charging,69 often
focusing on declination as one way to limit severity.70
Like with variability, there is no explicit guidance for prosecutors not
to seek the most serious charge they can prove. Scholars and federal
prosecutor guidebooks have supported this position, though the tide is
turning towards advising prosecutors to decline to charge when
possible to reduce the carceral state.71 Our study presents respondents
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1965 (1992) (“[Broad criminal statutes give prosecutors]
an unchecked opportunity to overcharge and generate easy pleas . . . .”).
64 Burke, supra note 63, at 202.
65 Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1355.
66 Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2020)
(citing NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.3 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009)).
67 Id.
68 Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public
Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 599, 612 (2019) (noting that inequitable results may
occur because “one victim may wish to pursue charges and a harsh sentence and yet the
other victim [in a similar case] may not want charges filed.”).
69 See Bellin, supra note 66, at 1248 (identifying “the progressive intuition that
prosecutors should not charge a more severe offense to obtain plea bargaining
leverage.”); see also Maura Ewing, America’s Leading Reform-Minded District Attorney
Has Taken His Most Radical Step Yet, SLATE (Dec. 4, 2018, 3:40 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasnercriminal-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/4PLW-78XC] (quoting Larry Krasner,
“The era of trying to get away with the highest charge regardless of the facts is over.”).
70 See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV.
1415, 1445 (2021) (“[T]he anti-carceral prosecutor seeks to enact policies of
declination.”); W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV.
173, 176 (2021) (discussing prosecutorial nullification as a populist response to severe
criminal codes).
71 See Unlocking the Black Box of Prosecution, VERA, https://www.vera.org/unlocking-theblack-box-of-prosecution/for-prosecutors (last visited Jan. 14, 2022) [https://perma.cc/
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with a hypothetical, relatively minor crime to explore both the
variability and severity of punishment prosecutors recommend for the
same crime.
C. National and Local Guidance for Prosecutors
Notwithstanding their broad discretion, prosecutors are subject to
rules of professional conduct in their jurisdiction, ABA and NDAA
guidance, and possibly internal office guidelines on prosecutor
charging. While these standards may technically apply, there is little
accountability if prosecutors refuse to comply72 and little assurance that
prosecutors are even aware of these guidelines.
1.

Rules of Professional Conduct

Prosecutors are governed by standards of professional conduct in
their jurisdiction, and through the ABA.73 However, as Bruce Green
points out, the idea that prosecutors have “higher ethical obligations
than other lawyers . . . is largely absent from the ethics rules.”74 While
the comments to ABA Rule 3.8 state that prosecutors have “the
responsibility of a minister of justice,”75 this charge is ill-defined.76

QTP7-W6WL] (“Based on this information, they are training line prosecutors to decline
or divert more cases and to aggressively pursue alternatives to incarceration.”).
72 Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 396.
73 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017). The NDAA has challenged the legitimacy of ABA guidance. Brief for National
District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 5, Smith v.
Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (No. 10-8145) (referring to the ABA as “a private organization
that does not speak for prosecutors” and stating, “[T]he ABA has become captive to the
narrow adversarial interests of the criminal defense bar”).
74 Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 149 (2016); see also R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context:
What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 691 (2006) (arguing that Model Rule 3.8’s emphasis on the
“responsibility” of prosecutors to seek justice “is obscured” both by “minimum conduct
rules within Rule 3.8” and “burying the ‘justice’ exhortation in a later comment to the
Rule”).
75 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
76 Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and
Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996) (“When the ABA
advises prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or ‘administrators of justice,’ it is using
juris-babble that is practically meaningless to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”); Fred
C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) (arguing that the vagueness of the charge to “do
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Some jurisdictions “have revised or supplemented [ABA] Rule 3.8(a) to
further regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions.”77 But even if these
guidelines have been supplemented, “[b]y and large . . . bar authorities
have proven to be ineffectual” when it comes to accountability.78
Indeed, when prosecutors act inappropriately in violation of the rules
of professional conduct, discipline is rare.79 The conventional wisdom
in this area is that “disciplinary authorities do not effectively regulate
prosecutors.”80 Sanctions — if they exist — are typically minimal,81 and
overall prosecutors are rarely disciplined relative to other lawyers.82 It
is certainly possible that broader ethics rules could be applied to
prosecutors in some instances, but these rules may not extend to “reach
abuses of prosecutorial charging discretion[.]”83 As a whole, while rules
of professional conduct exist for prosecutors, they do not regulate
prosecutor charging discretion.
2.

ABA and NDAA Guidance

National guidelines — from the ABA and NDAA — do not seek to
limit prosecutor charging beyond what the evidence supports for a
conviction. The ABA offers some guidance in the form of Criminal
Justice Standards, but there is little specificity or limitations for
prosecutors in these recommendations. For example, the ABA cautions
that “[a] prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the
prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by
probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support
justice” “has significant costs” and “undermines professional discipline of prosecutorial
misconduct”).
77 Green & Levine, supra note 74, at 152.
78 Bibas, supra note 14, at 976.
79 Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873, 874 (2012); see also Mark C. Niles, A New Balance of Evils: Prosecutorial Misconduct,
IQBAL, and the End of Absolute Immunity, 13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 137, 148-54 (2017)
(“Criminal culpability and/or professional sanction . . . have little if any impact on the
actual practice of law in this country.”); see also KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE
POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA
1997–2009, at 54-61 (2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2
[https://perma.cc/M556-C6UP] (finding a significant lack of State Bar discipline for
prosecutorial misconduct in California).
80 Green & Levine, supra note 74, at 151 (“[P]roportionately fewer prosecutors are
publicly disciplined when compared with private practitioners.”).
81 Bibas, supra note 14, at 977.
82 Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721,
755 (2001).
83 Green & Levine, supra note 74, at 153.
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conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge
is in the interests of justice.”84 Critics have claimed that this probable
cause requirement is “essentially meaningless” and the “sufficient
admissible evidence to support a conviction [standard] is likewise far
too easily satisfied to provide any real limitation upon, or incentive to
exercise, case-specific evaluation by the prosecutor.”85 The ABA
standards make clear they are purely “aspirational” and “are not
intended to serve as the basis for . . . professional discipline[.]”86
Similarly, the NDAA standards are “aspirational” and “are not intended
to . . . be used by the judiciary in determining whether a prosecutor
committed error or engaged in improper conduct; [or] be used by
disciplinary agencies when passing upon allegations of violations of
rules of ethical conduct[.]”87 The NDAA has expressed disagreement
with the Rules of Professional Conduct on at least one occasion.88 The
NDAA’s position seems to be that “prosecutors . . . should be exempt
from state-court rules of professional conduct that do more than mirror
preexisting legal obligations.”89 Neither national body seeks to limit
prosecutor discretion in charging.
3.

Internal Standards of Individual Prosecutor Offices

With a gap in national regulation,90 there is an argument that internal
standards and regulations could serve an important role in limiting
84 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n
2017).
85 Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 669, 680-81 (1992); see also CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“The ABA also encourages prosecutors to make use of
ethical guidance offered by existing organizations, and . . . to establish and make use of
an ethics advisory group . . . .”); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 259, 268 (2001) (“If probable cause is the only restriction on prosecutorial
charging discretion, then it is a very broad power indeed.”).
86 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017) (“These Standards . . . are aspirational or describe ‘best practices,’ and are not
intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional discipline, to create
substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted persons, to create a standard
of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to suppress evidence or
dismiss a charge.”).
87 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, at Introduction (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
88 Brief for National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 73, at 13 (taking issue with the obligation that Model Rule 3.8(d)
places on prosecutors in the states in which it has been adopted).
89 Green, supra note 79, at 886.
90 See Bibas, supra note 14, at 1016 (“Conventional external regulation has failed to
guide prosecutors.”).
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prosecutorial discretion.91 In most jurisdictions, chief prosecutors are
elected, and are therefore thought to be accountable to the public.
“[H]ead prosecutors can align their subordinates’ actions with
principals’ interests by writing down and enforcing procedural and
substantive office policies.”92 Both the ABA and NDAA stress the
importance of policies in individual prosecutor’s offices. According to
the ABA, “[e]ach prosecutor’s office should seek to develop general
policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion[.]”93 The
NDAA standards clarify that “[i]nitial standards or guidelines for
charging will be established by the chief prosecutor only[.]”94
Despite guidance to formulate internal policies for prosecutors, there
is little incentive to promulgate or follow such internal rules.95 One
study indicated that prosecutors’ offices lacked effective policies or
structures for proper accountability.96 Prosecutor offices may also lack
clear standards guiding charging decisions.97 Prosecutorial guidelines
governing charging and bargaining discretion “should be specific
enough to provide genuine guidance when applied to a particular set of
facts.”98 On a federal level, the United States Attorneys’ Manual “does
contain some general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, but they are written so broadly that they provide little
guidance.”99 Prosecutors may not want internal rules to be too specific.
Courts have “consistently . . . ruled that a prosecutor’s failure to follow
91 See Miller & Wright, supra note 6, at 161-65 (arguing that internal policies and
regulations can be effective).
92 Bibas, supra note 14, at 1003.
93 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
94 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.4 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
95 See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1564-65 (“Few prosecutors’ offices, if left to their
own devices, will promulgate guidelines that limit their freedom in a significant way,
and courts are unlikely to require standards in the absence of legislative direction.”).
96 Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined
by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 539 (2011) (presenting case studies from “three New York City
District Attorneys’ Offices,” and finding that the offices failed to discipline prosecutors
and lacked codes of conduct).
97 See Levine & Wright, supra note 42, at 1174 (finding that none of the offices
studied in two Southeast metropolitan areas used “a charging or sentencing grid”).
98 Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1562-63.
99 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 979, 999 (1995); see also
Amsler, supra note 13, at 186 (noting that, aside from prosecution “on the basis of race,
religion, or any other ‘arbitrary classification’ or protected right,” charging decisions are
“largely subject to nonmandatory guidelines”).
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applicable written criteria cannot serve as a defense or cause of
action.”100 But fear of litigation or public review might prevent more
specific written charging guidelines.101 One motivation that might lead
prosecutors to “be reluctant to adopt [charging] polic[ies] is the fact
that prosecutors have to run for election and any policy that might be
seen as ‘soft’ on crime can raise a political issue that might put the
prosecutor on the defensive.”102 Thus, formal and public guidelines
“may result in guidelines that are considerably harsher than those
policies that an office would be willing to live with on an informal
basis.”103 Fear of public oversight and litigation may encourage
prosecutors not to promulgate specific charging guidelines.
Even when guidelines or charging grids exist, they may not be used.
One study of forty-two misdemeanor and drug prosecutors in the
Southeast found that none of the sites studied “employe[d] a charging
or sentencing grid that prosecutors are supposed to follow[.]”104 In
addition, a survey of prosecutors in 2018 found that although many
prosecutors (sixty-five percent of those surveyed) used data to set
guidelines, they often did not use the data to track compliance with
office guidance.105 Some scholars have noted that even when charging
policies exist, they tend to have little impact on individual case
evaluations by line prosecutors.106
Charging guidelines, while an important step, may be limited in their
efficacy.107 Our study questions prosecutors about whether they have
internal standards or guidelines that guide their decision making and
limit their charging ability.

100 Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 654
(2002); see Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1366-67.
101 Even when prosecutors offices have internal guidelines, they may oppose public
transparency or review of such guidelines. See Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1364-67.
102 Id. at 1365.
103 Id.
104 Levine & Wright, supra note 42, at 1174.
105 ROBIN OLSEN, LEIGH COURTNEY, CHLOE WARNBERG & JULIA SAMUELS, URB. INST. FOR
JUST., COLLECTING AND USING DATA FOR PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING 11-12 (2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99044/collecting_and_using_data
_for_prosecutorial_decisionmaking_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T52C-6RBT].
106 Melilli, supra note 85, at 683.
107 Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1346 n.95 (“[G]uidelines are oversold as a remedy for
limiting prosecutorial discretion.”).
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D. Factors Relevant to Prosecutors in Charging Decisions
There are no universal factors prosecutors must consider in charging
decisions, except avoiding suspect classifications such as defendants’
race or national origin.108 The ABA standards include a laundry list of
potential factors prosecutors “may” consider when deciding whether to
bring charges.109 For instance, the ABA standards encourage
consideration of “the strength of the case,” “the extent . . . of harm
caused,” and “the views and motives of the victim or complainant.”110
The NDAA standards include a similar lengthy list of factors that “may”
be considered when screening potential charges.111 These NDAA
108 Green, supra note 68, at 614 (“[O]nce one gets beyond the obvious suspect
classifications, there is no agreement on which considerations are or are not
legitimate.”).
109 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017) (“Among the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising
discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal charge . . . are: (i) the strength of
the case; (ii) the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (iii) the extent or
absence of harm caused by the offense; (iv) the impact of prosecution or nonprosecution on the public welfare; (v) the background and characteristics of the
offender, including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation; (vi) whether
the authorized or likely punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in
relation to the particular offense or the offender; (vii) the views and motives of the
victim or complainant; (viii) any improper conduct by law enforcement; (ix)
unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons; (x) potential collateral
impact on third parties, including witnesses or victims; (xi) cooperation of the offender
in the apprehension or conviction of others; (xii) the possible influence of any cultural,
ethnic, socioeconomic or other improper biases; (xiii) changes in law or policy; (xiv)
the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources; (xv) the likelihood
of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and (xvi) whether the public’s interests in the
matter might be appropriately vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative,
or private remedies.”).
110 Id.
111 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-1.3 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009) (“Factors
that may be considered in [the charging] decision include: a. Doubt about the accused’s
guilt; b. Insufficiency of admissible evidence to support a conviction; c. The negative
impact of a prosecution on a victim; d. The availability of adequate civil remedies; e.
The availability of suitable diversion and rehabilitative programs; f. Provisions for
restitution; g. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice authority; h.
Whether non-prosecution would assist in achieving other legitimate goals, such as the
investigation or prosecution of more serious offenses; i. The charging decisions made
for similarly-situated defendants; j. The attitude and mental status of the accused; k.
Undue hardship that would be caused to the accused by the prosecution; l. A history of
non-enforcement of the applicable law; m. Failure of law enforcement to perform
necessary duties or investigations; n. The expressed desire of an accused to release
potential civil claims against victims, witnesses, law enforcement agencies and their
personnel, or the prosecutor and his personnel, where such desire is expressed after
having the opportunity to obtain advice of counsel and is knowing and voluntary; o.
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standards allow consideration of “insufficiency of admissible evidence,”
“availability of suitable diversion or rehabilitation programs,” and
“[w]hether the size of the loss or the extent of the harm caused . . . is
too small to warrant a criminal sanction.”112 In addition, the NDAA
standards list factors “that may be relevant” to whether the specific
charges “are consistent with the interests of justice.”113 A Washington
State Supreme Court case specifically identified “the public interest as
well as the strength of the case which could be proven” as relevant to a
prosecutor’s decision “whether to charge suspects with criminal
offenses.”114 Determining what factors prosecutors consider and how
they are balanced is difficult, as prosecutors have resisted pleas to
publish charging guidelines.115
Prior research indicates that some common factors and
considerations are important for prosecutor charging decisions. These
include “the seriousness of the offense, the defendant’s prior criminal
record, the victim’s interest in prosecution, the strength of the evidence,
the likelihood of conviction, and the availability of alternative
dispositions.”116 Other factors traditionally considered by prosecutors
in deciding whether to press charges include “the citizen’s education,
vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,

Whether the alleged crime represents a substantial departure from the accused’s history
of living a law-abiding life; p. Whether the accused has already suffered substantial loss
in connection with the alleged crime; q. Whether the size of the loss or the extent of the
harm caused by the alleged crime is too small to warrant a criminal sanction . . . .”).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 4-2.4 (“[Relevant factors may include:] a. The nature of the offense,
including whether the crime involves violence or bodily injury; b. The probability of
conviction; c. The characteristics of the accused that are relevant to his or her
blameworthiness or responsibility, including the accused’s criminal history; d. Potential
deterrent value of incapacitating the accused in the event of a conviction; e. The value
to society of incapacitating the accused in the event of a conviction; f. The willingness
of the offender to cooperate with law enforcement; g. The defendant’s relative level of
culpability in the criminal activity; h. The status of the victim, including the victim’s
age or special vulnerability; i. Whether the accused held a position of trust at the time
of the offense; j. Excessive costs of prosecution in relation to the seriousness of the
offense; k. Recommendation of the involved law enforcement personnel; l. The impact
of the crime on the community; m. Any other aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.”).
114 State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 219, 223 (Wash. 1984).
115 Misner, supra note 8, at 744 (“Attempts to convince prosecutors to publish the
guidelines for making prosecutorial charging decisions . . . have generally gone
unheeded.”).
116 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 34-35 (1998).
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community ties, and the socioeconomic status of the offender.”117 Some
of these factors are arguably not permissible, including education or
socioeconomic status since they criminalize poverty and are associated
with race.118 Other unstated factors for prosecutor charging include
“internal rules, external resource constraints, and a balancing of
interdependent relationships.”119 Office funding levels are also a factor
in charging decisions, as limited resources require prioritization.120 And
a progressive prosecutor may consider “whether [a defendant]
‘deserve[s],’ or the community benefits from” bringing charges.121 Our
study will explore factors prosecutors claim are important to their
charging decisions.
E. Declination
Whether to bring charges, or decline, is entirely up to the prosecutor’s
discretion.122 Indeed, the prosecutor’s decision not to charge a case is
largely unreviewable.123 The ABA standards clarify that there are some
situations where charges may not be appropriate but fail to clarify when
such a situation exists, only stating that “[t]he prosecutor should . . .
consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing
alternatives to prosecution[.]”124 The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct clarify that a prosecutor should not bring a charge if the
“prosecutor knows [the charge] is not supported by probable cause.”125
The NDAA standards do not include significant guidance covering
117

Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1368-69.
See Christopher Robertson, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright,
Race and Class: A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
807, 808, 816-18 (2019) (describing how consideration of socioeconomic status and
education may be one cause of racial disparities in the criminal justice system).
119 Stemen & Frederick, supra note 46, at 83.
120 Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1542-43 (“Funding levels determine how many cases
can be brought and inevitably force prosecutors’ offices to give little or no attention to
many chargeable crimes.”).
121 Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution: A Review of Charged by Emily
Bazelon, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 218, 244 (2020).
122 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
123 Misner, supra note 8, at 743.
124 ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS § 3-1.2(e) (“The prosecutor should be knowledgeable
about, consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing alternatives to
prosecution or conviction . . . .”).
125 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
118
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when declination is appropriate. However, they do specify that
prosecutors’ offices should maintain “a record of the reasons for
declining a prosecution” where such record is “permitted by law.”126
Common reasons for declination of charges include practical
considerations or broader considerations of fairness. According to
Angela Davis, “[t]he decision to forego charges may be based on
practical considerations such as the triviality of the offense and/or the
victim’s lack of interest in prosecution.127 This decision may also be
based on considerations of fairness and justice in a particular case.”128
Richard Frase indicates that the declination decision is closely related
to the offense in the case.129 A study of federal declination decisions in
the Northern District of Illinois found that “the most common specific
reason for declination was the state-prosecution alternative. In order,
the next most frequently cited reasons were: small amount of loss by
the victims; prior record of the defendant; small amount of contraband,
such as drugs or guns; the isolated nature of the defendant’s act; and
insufficient evidence of a criminal act.”130 However, there was a wide
variety in reasons cited for declination.131 Categorizing these reasons
into ten groups, “[m]inor offense appears most frequently, followed by
state
prosecution,
insufficient
evidence,
and
defendant
characteristics.”132 A similar study of causes for prosecutor declination
has not been conducted using a national sample of prosecutors. Our
study will explore reasons why state prosecutors decline to bring cases.
II.

NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY DATA AND METHODS

The data for this study of prosecutors comes from an experimental
survey instrument administered to state and local prosecutors in 2016
and 2017. The survey contained questions about how the respondents
made charging decisions and demographic questions. The survey also
contained a vignette, which consisted of fictional police reports
describing a minor crime, and questions about what charging decision
126

NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-1.7 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
Davis, supra note 24, at 409.
128 Id.
129 Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 257 (1980) (“[I]mportation of
marijuana[,] . . . theft of government property, theft from interstate shipment,
miscellaneous frauds, civil rights cases, and simple assaults [were almost never
prosecuted].”).
130 Id. at 262.
131 Id. (“[A] total of forty-three different reasons were cited in sample declinations.”).
132 Id. at 262-64.
127
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respondents would make based on the facts presented and stipulated
laws of the jurisdiction. The vignette manipulated the race and social
class of the defendant so that we could assess the impact of these status
characteristics on prosecutors’ charging decisions. The findings from
the experiment portion of the study, showing no evidence of race or
class bias on prosecutors’ charging decisions, have been previously
published.133
This Article presents additional findings from responses to the
vignette questions as well as quantitative findings from the survey
questions about how prosecutors make decisions in other cases.
Additionally, this study presents findings from qualitative analysis of
prosecutors’ responses to open-ended survey questions about decision
making.
A. Sample
We were interested in how state and local (not federal) prosecutors
make charging decisions, but unfortunately, there is no list of all such
prosecutors. We had hoped to be able to partner with professional
associations to which prosecutors belong to obtain the names and
contact information of affiliated prosecutors, but those groups declined
to cooperate. We thus created our own sample of state and local
prosecutors.
To ensure our sample contained prosecutors from across the country,
we selected one to two states from each of the nine U.S. Census Bureau
regions and conducted web searches for state and local prosecutors’
names and email addresses. Some state websites list all state employees,
including prosecutors. More often, however, if a government website
listed the names and contact information for prosecutors, this
information was available on county websites. Many counties opt only
to list the name of the head prosecutor, however, so we also used state
bar association websites to collect names and contact information for
members who indicated they were or had been state or local
prosecutors. Finally, we submitted Freedom of Information Act
requests to states for lists of their prosecutors and email addresses. Our
final sample included 4,484 state and local prosecutors.134

133

Robertson et al., supra note 118, at 822-43.
This is not a representative sample, and there is bias in who opted or declined to
participate in this study. Some head prosecutors opted out on behalf of their entire
office.
134
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We then emailed those prosecutors inviting them to participate in the
study,135 which we hosted on Qualtrics. Upon completion of the study,
respondents could request a gift card to Amazon for five dollars.
Ultimately, 542 prosecutors completed the survey for a response rate of
12.09%.
A detailed description of the sample can be seen in Table 1.136 Most
respondents were men (65.85%), white (90.26%), and not Hispanic
(96.07%). The average age of respondents was forty-six years, and
respondents averaged about twelve and a half years as a prosecutor.
22.55% of respondents were the head prosecutor in their office. The
average office size was about thirty-five prosecutors. Most respondents
were from the Mountain (24.07%), Midwest (21.3%), and South
Atlantic (14.63%) regions.137 Many respondents were prosecutors in
jurisdictions containing less than 100,000 people (42.49%) or between
100,000 and 500,000 people (28.58%).
Table 1 — Descriptive Statistics
Percent of Sample or
Mean
Recommended Disposition of Case
Felony Charge
Monetary Penalty
Average Amount of Monetary Penalty
Confinement
135

16.05%
41.68%
$247.21
27.83%

This study was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board.
A similar table appears in Robertson et al., supra note 118, at 823. The sample
description reported here differs slightly because, in our prior work, we eliminated some
responses based on the time a respondent spent on the study as a quality control
mechanism to ensure the integrity of the experimental portion of the study. For a
description, see id. at 819.
137 The regional breakdown is as follows:
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or
Vermont.
Middle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, or Pennsylvania.
Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, or Wisconsin.
West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or
South Dakota.
South Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia.
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, or Tennessee.
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, or Oklahoma.
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, or
Wyoming.
Pacific: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington.
136
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Average Minimum Days of Confinement
Jurisdiction Characteristics
Average Size of Office
Size of Jurisdiction
Over 2,000,000 people
1,000,000-2,000,000 people
500,000-1,000,000 people
100,000-500,000 people
Less than 100,000 people
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Prosecutor Characteristics
Average Number of Years as Prosecutor
Head Prosecutor
Average Age
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
Other
Hispanic
No
Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano
Puerto Rican
Cuban
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino

[Vol. 55:2133

25.73 days
34.83 prosecutors
7.42%
10.76%
10.76%
28.58%
42.49%
4.44%
3.52%
21.30%
10.93%
14.63%
8.52%
0.93%
24.07%
11.67%
12.52 years
22.55%
46.02 years
65.86%
34.14%
90.26%
3.93%
0.56%
1.12%
0.19%
3.93%
96.07%
1.50%
0.19%
0.94%
1.31%
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B. Instrument
Our survey contained twenty-three questions with some follow-up
probes. The survey asked prosecutors some screening questions to
ensure that they were or had been prosecutors. They then were asked
to read two fictional police reports about a relatively minor crime for
which prosecutors could have recommended various charges or no
charges at all. In the vignette, a man at a train station was arrested for,
in the words of one arresting officer, “yelling obscenities, stopping
patrons for money, and brandishing a knife.” The man was emotionally
distressed from a recent breakup with his girlfriend and needed money
for a train ride, but when no one gave him any money, he became more
upset. One witness reported that the man, while holding a knife, had
grabbed a woman’s arm after she refused to give him money, but did
not hurt or threaten her. Although people at the train station were
scared, no one was physically hurt. The man submitted to an arrest
without incident.
We then provided sample criminal statutes and sentencing guidelines
and asked prosecutors what charges they would bring, if any. We also
asked respondents what monetary penalty or term of confinement they
would recommend, if any, and the reasoning for their recommendation.
These were open-ended questions, and a text box was provided for
respondents to write their penalty recommendations and reasoning.
We then asked a series of five close-ended questions about how
respondents make charging and plea-bargaining decisions in their office
and provided space for respondents to provide additional explanations
if they desired. The survey concluded with eleven questions about
respondents’ office, jurisdiction, and demographic characteristics. We
designed the study to take approximately fifteen minutes to complete
and piloted it with prosecutors in Salt Lake City.138
C. Method
As noted above, we have previously reported some findings from the
experimental portion of the study. In this paper, we report additional
quantitative and qualitative analysis of respondents’ punishment
recommendations for the defendant described in the vignette, as well as
descriptions of respondents’ prosecutorial decision-making process. We
present descriptive results from frequency distributions using the data

138 See Megan S. Wright, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Christopher T. Robertson,
Supplemental Materials: National Prosecutory Survey, 55 UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2022).

2162

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:2133

from the close-ended survey questions. The study also yielded
qualitative data from the text that respondents provided to the survey
questions, which we transformed into quantitative data for purposes of
reporting descriptive statistics. We also coded qualitative data from the
survey questions and the experimental portion of the study inductively
based on themes that emerged from the data.
III. RESULTS OF NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY
This Part explains the results of our national prosecutor study. Part
III.A reviews the recommended charges and penalties imposed by
respondents for the hypothetical crime they reviewed. Part III.B reviews
the various reasons respondents provided to support their decisions.
Some of these reasons include that respondents believed punishment is
necessary despite the fact that this is a minor crime. Others note
financial or mental health condition of the defendant, and others
specifically note that a little jail time could teach the defendant a lesson.
After the respondents answered questions about the vignette, we then
asked respondents about how prosecutors in their office make charging
decisions. We asked who makes the charging decision, whether the
crime is a felony or misdemeanor changes the decision-making process,
who prosecutes the case after decisions are made about charging, and
whether their office has internal guidelines or standards governing
charging decisions. The prosecutor responses about the general process
for making charging decisions is recounted in Part III.C.
A. Recommended Charges and Penalties
Respondents could choose from a range of charges to bring in
response to the arrest described in the vignette or to bring no charges at
all. The below figure shows that just eighteen respondents declined to
bring charges and that almost eighty percent of respondents brought
multiple charges. The mean number of charges recommended was 3.15
[CI 2.99, 3.31], and the maximum number of charges recommended
was eleven (the maximum number of charges that could be
recommended was sixteen).
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There was variation in the number of charges recommended by region
in which the respondent worked as a prosecutor. See Table 2 for the
mean number of charges recommended by region, as well as the range
of charges recommended by region.
Table 2 — Number of Charges by Region
Region

Mean Number Minimum
Charges
Number
Charges

Maximum
Number
Charges

New England

2.88

0

8

Middle
Atlantic

4.37

1

10

Midwest

2.45

0

10

West North
Central

3.39

0

8

South Atlantic

3.82

0

11

East South
Central

2.83

0

6

West South
Central

3.2

2

6

Mountain

3.25

0

10

Pacific

3.11

1

8
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There was one felony charge that respondents could select, and
sixteen percent opted to charge the defendant with a felony.139 There
was variation in whether a felony was charged by region in which the
respondent worked as a prosecutor. See Figure 2 below for the
percentage of respondents who recommended a felony charge by
region. Notably, the South Atlantic region prosecutors were most likely
to recommend a felony charge, followed by the Mountain region
prosecutors.

While the vast majority of respondents would bring multiple charges,
far fewer recommended a monetary penalty. Almost sixty percent of
respondents recommended no monetary penalty in this instance,
although there was significant variation by region. All West South
Central prosecutors recommended a monetary penalty.

139 See Table 1. Similar results for outcome variables of interest appeared in
Robertson et al., supra note 118. The results reported here differ slightly because, in our
prior work, we eliminated some responses based on the time a respondent spent on the
study as a quality control mechanism to ensure the integrity of the experimental portion
of the study. For a description, see Robertson et al., supra note 118, at 819.
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Of those who did recommend a monetary penalty, the recommended
amount tended to be less than $500 (mean recommended monetary
penalty was $247.21 [CI $200.05, $294.37].140 It is important to note,
however, that some respondents did recommend amounts up to $5,000.
See below figure for distribution of recommended monetary penalty.

The amount of monetary penalty recommended also varied by region,
shown in the below table. The minimum monetary penalty in all regions
140

See Table 1.
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was zero, except in West South Central, where the minimum monetary
penalty was $500.
Table 3 — Amount of Monetary Penalty by Region
Region

Mean Monetary
Penalty

Maximum Monetary
Penalty

New England
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

$10.87
$88.89
$191.83
$138.46
$355.84
$202.22
$500
$359.17
$215.74

$250
$750
$5,000
$1,000
$2,500
$1,000
$500
$5,000
$2,500

Respondents were even less likely to recommend confinement. Over
seventy percent of respondents recommended no term of confinement,
although this varied by region. See Figure 5.

Of those who did recommend confinement, the recommendation
tended to be less than thirty days in jail (mean recommended days of
confinement was 25.73 days [CI 17.37, 34.10].141 See Figure 6 below
141 See Table 1. Some respondents recommended a year in jail (eleven), and two
respondents recommended longer than two years in jail.
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for the distribution of recommendations for minimum days of
confinement.

The days of confinement recommended varied by region in which the
prosecutor worked. The minimum number of days of confinement
recommended was zero in each region. See Table 4 below.
Table 4 — Minimum Days of Confinement by Region
Region

Mean Days

Maximum Days

New England

5.22

90

Middle Atlantic

22.94

180

Midwest

17.81

365

West North Central

17.37

365

South Atlantic

53.81

1500

East South Central

18.93

365

West South Central

0

0

Mountain

26.01

720

Pacific

25.69

365

As indicated by the above figures, we found extremely wide
heterogeneity in how respondents resolved the exact same case.
Although eighteen respondents resolved the case without pressing any
charges, the modal respondent imposed two charges, and some sought
seven or more. Similarly, although many respondents sought no
monetary penalty at all, and the modal respondent who sought a
monetary penalty sought $500 or less, some demanded as much as
$5,000. Most strikingly, we saw many respondents resolving the case
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without any jail time, but others demanding a month, or even up to two
years in one case. And there was significant variability in the number of
charges and recommended punishment by respondents’ region.
B. Reasons for Recommendations
Beyond asking prosecutors to charge the hypothetical case, we were
also interested in why prosecutors decided to make specific
recommendations. We thus asked respondents to explain their
reasoning for their charging and penalty recommendations.142 This
question was not mandatory, but many respondents chose to explain
their reasoning, and we coded the responses for common themes,
presented below. The five common themes provided for prosecutors’
recommendations are described in Part III.B.1 necessity of punishment
despite a minor crime; Part III.B.2 the financial state of offender; Part
III.B.3 the mental state of offender; Part III.B.4 the benefit of jail time
for offender; and Part III.B.5 plea bargaining considerations.
1.

Necessity of Punishment, Despite Minor Crime

A large group of prosecutors recommended punishment for the
defendant, despite their recognition that this was a minor crime. Nearly
half of respondents (230) observed that the crime was relatively minor.
Many respondents described the conduct using phrases like “No big
deal,” “Relatively minor offenses,” and “The crime is de minimus, and
no one was harmed.” Such respondents framed the offender’s conduct
as part of a “bad day” that resulted in no consequential harm and did
not view the defendant as a threat to public safety or likely to reoffend.
Despite understanding the crime to be minor, half of these
respondents (115) still recommended some sort of penalty.
Respondents who felt that some punishment was warranted despite the
lack of harm tended to use a monetary penalty instead of confinement
(eighty-two recommended imposing a fine or court costs, and of this
group, eight mentioned that community service could be used to pay
the monetary penalty).143

142 Respondents were directed to “Please write a couple of sentences explaining your
decision in the scenario that you reviewed.”
143 Seven respondents chose to recommend only a term of confinement, and 26
recommended both a term of confinement and a monetary penalty. One respondent
who recommended two days in jail and a $500 fine plus court costs wrote, “People make
mistakes. No one was hurt, and this man doesn’t appear to need to be locked away for
life based on one bad day. The goal is to make it sting a bit, and give him the tools to
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Respondents who only imposed a monetary penalty focused on
wanting to deter future bad conduct, but noted that jail was not
warranted given that there was no public threat and that incarceration
would be harmful to the offender. A junior prosecutor in the Mountain
region who recommended a $600 monetary penalty and no jail time
wrote, “While some punishment may be necessary, such as a fine, in
order to deter the Defendant from committing the same acts under
similar circumstances, I don’t think jail would be beneficial for anyone
in this case.”144 Similarly, a junior prosecutor from the Pacific region
who recommended a $100 fine explained: “I believe in this case a
minimal monetary sanction with a suspended sentence would get the
point across . . . that his behavior is not appropriate, but would also not
blow the situation/incident out of proportion.”145 A midcareer
prosecutor from the South Atlantic region respondent who
recommended probation and a fine between $350 and $500 wrote, “I
want something that takes it seriously that a person is possibly drunk
and wielding a weapon but also an opportunity to take responsibility
without facing the worst sentence.”146
Some monetary penalty recommendations were more severe,
however. A prosecutor from the Pacific region with twenty years
experience who recommended a $2,500 fine wrote, “There needs to be
some accountability, but no one was actually injured and I think the
negative impact of a felony or a jail sentence is disproportionate to the
harm imposed by the defendant’s actions in this case. I think a large fine
and suspended sentence are appropriate.”147
Some respondents appeared to impose a fine to further different
criminal justice purposes, such as increasing funding for law
enforcement. A junior prosecutor from the Mountain region who
recommended only a $100 fine wrote, “I don’t believe he needs to be
incarcerated. The fines go towards furthering police work and programs
that help people with behavioral health issues.”148
make that behavior obsolete so he doesn’t re-offend.” See supra Part II.A (quoting
anonymous respondent identified as “7YCgT0SiaW44Hn”).
144 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2mkZw3uPnXe2nWV”).
145 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2sRdHxjA12tdf3a”).
146 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1dnUmYZZr1R5LZi”).
147 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2anJFJKuqey4l2e”).
148 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3G2DRgFXl7oPsdz”).
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Some respondents offered evidence-based reasons for recommending
a monetary penalty instead of jail time. A junior prosecutor from the
Midwest who recommended a $500 fine plus court costs argued,
“Additionally studies show that jail for someone who is low risk like
this defendant could actually do more damage by exposing him to high
risk individuals or jeopardizing his career through the period of
incarceration.”149 A Midwest prosecutor with almost thirty years of
experience who recommended only a $100 fine plus court costs
observed, “Evidence-based decision-making informs us that low risk
offenders tend to be self correcting and that placing them on probation
and/or incarcerating them will do more harm than good. I prefer to defer
him in a First Offender program if possible, and if not a monetary fine
should be sufficient retribution.”150
Many did not view any punishment as necessary, however. A
midcareer prosecutor from the Mountain region wrote, “I would decline
to prosecute . . . because I do not feel that he is a danger to the
community, nor do I believe this would be a good use of resources. Just
because acts fit the definition of a crime does not mandate that a person
be prosecuted. This is why prosecutors have discretion.”151 A midcareer
New England prosecutor wrote, “I do believe that this conduct is
properly classified as criminal, but it is pretty minor, and he has no
record, so the proverbial ‘slap on the wrist’ is appropriate.”152 An
experienced prosecutor from the Mountain region described their
reasoning for no punitive sanctions as follows: “I considered the social
harm (low) of the offense and the ascertainable risk of future crime
(low). I also considered the seriousness of the crime category (low). I
concluded that the suspect would be a good candidate for a diversion
or deferred prosecution.”153 A midcareer prosecutor from the South
Atlantic region similarly noted, “First time offender, there’s nothing that
incarceration can do on this case that probation can’t.”154

149 See
supra Part
“2dhhuJeue60lqX9”).
150 See
supra Part
“2atQZRNL0mVKhHA”).
151 See
supra Part
“ebOKc7b4o9jGwkV”).
152 See
supra Part
“2wREsUkzVDhejxP”).
153 See
supra Part
“1opqG1nUHb0YFei”).
154 See
supra Part
“SQc9Ih39JLhyipr”).
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Several respondents mentioned rehabilitation as a motivation for not
imposing punishment and wanted to connect the offender to additional
resources like anger management counseling, conflict resolution
courses, substance abuse treatment, and mental health treatment. Still
mindful of the negative impact on the victim of the crime, a junior
prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended no punishment
wrote, “I included the letter of apology to give [Defendant] an
opportunity to express any remorse he has over his behavior as well as
to provide a way for the named victim to feel her distress was
acknowledged and also so she is aware the judicial system responded to
this situation.”155
Overall, a large number of prosecutors deemed this crime to be a
minor one, although at least half of them still imposed a monetary
penalty or jail time.
2.

Considering the Financial State of Offender

A subset of prosecutors specifically noted the financial state of the
offender and considered this in their decision to charge and recommend
sanctions. Many respondents (fifty-eight) explicitly considered the
financial state of the offender when recommending punishment. Often,
monetary penalties were not imposed because, given the scenario
presented, respondents did not believe that the offender would be able
to pay. Some still felt that some sort of community restitution was
necessary, and so recommended community service in lieu of a
monetary penalty. As a junior prosecutor from the South Atlantic region
observed, “I would not ask for a monetary penalty because if he cannot
afford a train ticket, he likely cannot afford a monetary penalty.”156 This
respondent recommended ten hours of community service in lieu of a
fine. A junior prosecutor from the Mountain region who also
recommended community service in lieu of a monetary penalty because
of the defendant’s inability to pay wrote, “Given that he was asking for
money, it did not seem practical, or indeed useful to require a fine.
Instead, I would ask for something that would benefit the community
— that being community service.”157

155 See
supra Part
“1lcx0uWXrC2mT2E”).
156 See
supra Part
“2i6snRsjFtcJOJH”).
157 See
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Given the offender’s perceived inability to pay a monetary penalty,
several respondents thought imposing one may be too burdensome.
One such respondent, a head prosecutor in the Mountain region with
three years of experience, wrote that they would not impose a monetary
penalty because “[h]e would just be back in jail for not paying fines
which exceeds the scope of conduct that we should be punishing
here.”158
Some who thought the monetary penalty would be too burdensome
recommended connecting the offender to social services. A Midwest
junior prosecutor noted that given that “[h]e was desperate for money,
[monetary penalties] would not seem to do any good, but to make the
problem worse”159 and recommended probation and treatment. A
midcareer prosecutor from the Mountain region recommended
connecting the offender to “housing support and job skills along with
possible substance abuse counseling and treatment”160 combined with
supervision in lieu of a monetary penalty given the offender’s perceived
lack of means to pay.
Some respondents who recognized that a monetary penalty would be
too burdensome for the offender instead opted for imposing a term of
confinement; that is, they substituted jail for a fine. One South Atlantic
prosecutor with over twenty years of experience observed that “[a] fine
would be onerous”161 given that the offender had no money. To address
the fact that the alleged conduct upset the public, however, this
respondent recommended ten days of confinement. This prosecutor
failed to recognize the costs of ten days of confinement would likely be
more than a monetary penalty given that defendant was employed.162
Other respondents who recognized that the offender might not be
able to afford a fine still imposed a monetary penalty but seemed to
reduce the amount they would normally recommend. One such
respondent, a Midwest head prosecutor with three years of experience,
stated, “I only asked for $500.00 because from the fact scenario it
sounded like money is an issue for this person. I utilize the phrase ‘You
158 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“tLrbRR86gRqGzJL”).
159 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3TP7gh4qmk7qo5r”).
160 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1eLTmKILcmNPXq9”).
161 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3JrTfWnt7VwWc9K”).
162 See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(2017) (“[T]he value of lost freedom to pretrial detainees may be as high as $6,770 for
the least dangerous defendants.”).
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can’t squeeze blood from a turnip’ in cases like this.”163 A midcareer
prosecutor from the Mountain region observed, “It does not seem like
he has much money which is why a $350 fine will still be a stiff penalty
without being unfairly burdensome.”164 A junior Midwest prosecutor
who recommended a fine of up to $500 wrote, “It seems like this is a
mental health/poverty issue rather than there being any real criminal
intent.”165
Some respondents also focused on the offender’s employment status
to justify the imposition of a monetary penalty. One midcareer Midwest
prosecutor recommended a $500 monetary penalty and wrote, “The
defendant is gainfully employed with no prior record and can afford to
pay a fine.”166 Another respondent similarly justified a $1,000 fine.
One respondent wanted more information about the offender’s
financial state prior to making a recommendation about imposing a
monetary penalty. This experienced prosecutor from the South Atlantic
region wrote, “I would actually want more information about his. Is he
employed? Would a fine set him up for a violation because of an
inability to pay? I think that it is reasonable to levy a monetary sanction
but inability to pay cannot be ignored in my evaluation.”167
In sum, there was significant variability amongst respondents
considering the financial state of the offender in terms of what they
recommended. Overall, prosecutors seemed to try to tailor their
punishments to what they deemed was affordable for defendant,
although some imposed jail time even though that could be much more
costly in the long run.
3.

Mental Health Considerations

It was common for prosecutors to consider the defendant’s mental or
emotional health, as well as potential substance abuse. Many
respondents, assuming no prior criminal history, recommended mental
health assessments because they viewed this as the cause of the alleged
behavior, and several mentioned diversion to mental health court.
163 See
supra Part
“vcLDkIKoBMTx1Ul”).
164 See
supra Part
“2P8cmmpaP52cpPt”).
165 See
supra Part
“3NIdqqtlR4pULvT”).
166 See
supra Part
“1pus25jdUprulqI”).
167 See
supra Part
“2fuMrAvhdIYjxpU”).
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When explaining their reasoning for imposing (or not imposing) a
monetary penalty or term of confinement, 147 respondents (27.12%)
mentioned mental health, forty-six respondents (8.49%) mentioned
counseling or treatment, and twenty-nine respondents (4.06%)
mentioned anger management. In all, 222 respondents (40.96%)
considered the defendant’s mental health or emotional needs.
Many respondents concerned about the offender’s mental health
opted for no punishment. As one head prosecutor with three years of
experience in the West North Central region wrote, “While the
defendant’s behavior meets the technical requirements of the crimes
marked, it appears that his behavior may be resulting from either a
mental health or anger management issue. Therefore, my primary
motivation is [to] correct the problem, rather than to simply seek
punishment. This is especially true of a first-time offender. If the
defendant is willing to participate in a mental health screening and any
treatment recommended by the screening, that will most likely do more
to ensure the safety of the community than will a fine or a jail
sentence.”168
The lack of physical harm was also often paired with concerns about
the offender’s mental health to justify no negative sanctions. One head
prosecutor with ten years of experience in the Mountain region
conveyed, “[Defendant]’s behavior appears to be the result an acute
mental disorder or emotional disturbance. It makes sense to me to
provide him with an incentive to address the underlying issues. Had
anyone been injured by his behavior my analysis would be different.”169
Several respondents who did not impose a term of confinement or a
monetary penalty recognized that the offender needed additional help.
One head prosecutor with almost thirty years of experience in the West
North Central region observed, “This appears to be a troubled person
with needs beyond the criminal justice system.”170
Others who recommended no punishment wanted to connect the
offender to services necessary for rehabilitation. One head prosecutor
with five years of experience in the West North Central region who
sought no punishment recommended “drug/alcohol examination
and/or a mental health examination with follow-up treatment as

168 See
supra Part
“2QVW25BiyciTFug”).
169 See
supra Part
“2tsATdOdSiOWfnY”).
170 See
supra Part
“3Dwp2QVgyaYgKGt”).
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recommended, as that seems to be the root cause of the situation.”171
An experienced Midwest prosecutor who likewise did not recommend
a term of confinement or a monetary penalty wrote, “If the man has no
criminal history, it would appear that this is a mental health issue. I
would like to put him on probation and order treatment.”172
Sometimes respondents thought that the prospect of future
punishment was necessary to facilitate mental health treatment. One
head prosecutor in the Midwest region with sixteen years of experience
who recommended no punishment wrote, “Appears to be a mental
health incident. I would be satisfied with a stick (or carrot) to coerce
him to receive some mental health services.” 173 A midcareer Midwest
prosecutor who recommended suspended confinement and a fine
wrote, “I would recommended probation (suspended sentence) based
on the apparent rehabilitative needs; specifically alcohol treatment,
mental health treatment, and anger management. It is premature to
impose jail, however, should he fail on probation or reject probation, I
would recommend a jail sentence.”174 A head prosecutor with three
years of experience in the Pacific region who recommended a
suspended jail sentence wrote, “Best thing for community safety is for
him to get the help he needs. Jail hanging over his head provides an
incentive for him to get into treatment.”175
Some respondents focused on balancing the need for mental health
treatment with punishment. A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic
region who recommended a suspended sentence of 200 days in jail
wrote, “To me, justice in this situation is a balance between punishing
the defendant for the disruption of peace and preventing the defendant
from reoffending by ensuring that he receives the substance abuse
treatment and potential mental health treatment that he needs.”176
Despite the mental health issues latent in the vignette, not all
respondents who recognized that the incident could have been caused
171 The same prosecutor also noted that “[i]f the defendant had a long history of this
sort of behavior, my recommendation would be different.” See supra Part II.A (quoting
anonymous respondent identified as “1nTIOa3iaMSln9X”).
172 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2A0hIPf7Fe9JXFs”).
173 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3RxaKI5QlSMOqp2”).
174 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3WWbNCckXjcNoGJ”).
175 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3oKE8dV9z6cMcj7”).
176 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3PcyY7T617bSUMk”).
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by mental health problems opted not to impose a punishment. Of these
222 respondents, twelve recommended a term of confinement, 10
recommended a monetary penalty, and six recommended both.177 Some
respondents concerned about the mental health status of the offender
recommended only a fine. One very junior prosecutor in the South
Atlantic region recommended a $750 fine and wrote, “They were not in
danger of being injured. This is more than likely a mental health issue
or a one time occurrence triggered by the issue with his girlfriend.”178
Another junior South Atlantic prosecutor recommended a $500 fine and
wrote, “This sounds likely to be a mental health related or possibly
substance abuse related. A 29 year old with no previous criminal history
exhibiting this kind of behavior would likely benefit from some kind of
treatment significantly more than confinement or excessive fines.”179 A
midcareer South Atlantic prosecutor recommended diverting the
offender to mental health court and imposing a $250 to $500 fine,
writing, “[E]vidence that this episode may have been exacerbated by
alcohol and/or mental health issues which would be treatable,
preventing future violence and obviating the need for incarceration to
keep the community safe.”180
Some respondents thought that a term of confinement was
appropriate despite evidence of mental health issues, focusing on the
need for accountability. An experienced South Atlantic prosecutor who
recommended ten days in jail and a $750 fine wrote, “It sounds like a
mental health issue. The sentence will have conditions that require a
mental health evaluation. His lack of criminal history played into my
decision to go low on confinement, but because he did pose a threat to
the woman, he should be punished with some period of
incarceration.”181 A Middle Atlantic prosecutor with over twenty-five
years of experience who recommended up to four months in jail and a
$750 fine wrote, “I would seek 4 months in jail. However, if the
defendant sought counseling etc., and had no further arrests while the
case is pending, I’d consider a lesser jail sentence. While the defendant
177 Five respondents recommended community service in lieu of confinement or a
monetary penalty, and two recommended the offender be mandated to receive
counseling in lieu of punishment.
178 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1r1SGZSR9EduVwZ”).
179 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“ONfAJ9mo394BPfH”).
180 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1Gv1DBSu5pkIpv6”).
181 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2S2cZcgxBZuZMJu”).
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might have mental health issues, he also created a dangerous situation
in which the public felt obliged to flee from a public place for their own
safety.”182 An experienced Midwest prosecutor who recommended four
days in jail along with a $500 fine wrote, “My main concern with this
scenario is to make sure there was some accountability for the suspect’s
actions but it appears there may be some underlying emotional or
mental health issues that need to be addressed. I would see if there could
be a referral for a mental health exam.”183
Other respondents seeking a term of confinement focused on the
presence of a knife. A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region
who recommended a year in jail stated, “But for the knife he would have
likely received a term of probation with a condition of seeking mental
health treatment.”184 An experienced Midwest prosecutor
recommended a sixty-five day term of confinement in a psychiatric
facility, five years of probation, and a $500 fine and asserted, “He needs
evaluation and treatment, but needs to learn consequences of actions,
he caused public fear to several people and was willing to touch another
and brandish a knife.”185
Some only recommended a short period of confinement in order to
ensure that there was sufficient time to conduct a mental health
assessment. A midcareer Midwest prosecutor who recommended two
days in jail along with a $200 fine wrote, “The 2 day time period is really
just to ensure that the person can be assessed by community mental
health to see if treatment is necessary before release.”186
Further, some respondents considered the offender’s mental health
and concluded that there was no mental illness and that punishment
was thus appropriate. An experienced head prosecutor in the Mountain
region recommended 180 days in jail and noted, “This person does not
appear to suffer from a cognizable mental illness to further mitigate or
offer a basis for some kind of diversion. Therefor some incarceration

182 See
supra Part II.A
“3HhV0iKZTQ1pENE”).
183 See
supra Part II.A
“1gi3bL7DMPuNlSW”).
184 See
supra Part II.A
“3IQZivaXZgbtSEC”).
185 See
supra Part II.A
“2PsRAqMXBEWW9ES”).
186 See
supra Part II.A
“1M0uK0fZrWhYZy0”).
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would be appropriate followed by a probationary period to ensure the
defendant’s continued lawfulness.”187
Respondents who considered mental health varied not only in what
types of punishment they recommended, but also in their perception of
the offender’s danger to the community. A midcareer prosecutor in the
West North Central region who recommended only a mental health
evaluation wrote, “There is nothing to indicate he would need to be
incarcerated for . . . the safety of the community.”188 While an
experienced head prosecutor from the South Atlantic region who
imposed a $500 fine and two years of probation wrote, “He needs
mental help but he’s clearly a danger to society.” Some viewed the
offender as more of a danger to himself than society. A junior prosecutor
in the East South Central region recommended that “[Defendant has]
an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, eg participate in AA or some
other court approved drug and alcohol program, and any psychiatric
referral” because “[d]ue to any lack of intent to harm others (I saw him
more likely to harm himself), I would much rather see someone given
a chance and assistance than pop them with a charge even a
misdemeanor who is employed and allow him to be contributing society
member.”189
Overall, a large number of prosecutors noted mental health concerns
in their charging decisions, and those who noted such concerns largely
decided not to impose jail time or a fine, instead seeking mental health
treatment or other social and behavioral services. However, some
prosecutors imposed jail time and monetary penalties despite
recognizing potential mental health issues.
4.

Using Jail to Teach a Lesson

The vast majority of respondents did not think confinement was
appropriate, and those who did recommend a term of confinement
tended to recommend under thirty days in jail, with most opting to
impose fewer than ten days. When explaining their recommendations
for seeking a term of confinement, many respondents (45/145)

187 See
supra Part
“1mmIkQ2vidxSzfU”).
188 See
supra Part
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189 See
supra Part
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explicitly indicated that a short stay in jail was warranted to teach the
defendant a lesson.190
Some respondents focused on using jail to teach a lesson. One head
prosecutor with over thirty years of experience in the West North
Central region who recommended the offender serve two days in jail
and pay a $1,000 fine wrote, “Potentially serious consequences of his
stupidity but lucky this time - no one hurt - and no record; 2 days in
jail lets him see what jail is like and why he needs a smarter game plan
in the future to avoid getting in trouble.”191 A midcareer prosecutor in
the Midwest who recommended two days in jail along with a $200 fine
wrote that they wanted to “impress upon the suspect the
inappropriateness of the conduct, without unduly penalizing the
individual.”192 An experienced head prosecutor from the West South
Central region recommended up to three days in jail and a $500 fine
and observed, “People make mistakes. No one was hurt, and this man
doesn’t appear to need to be locked away for life based on one bad day.
The goal is to make it sting a bit, and give him the tools to make that
behavior obsolete so he doesn’t re-offend.”193
An experienced prosecutor in the West North Central region who
recommended four days in jail along with a $200 monetary penalty
noted, “The four days is to remind him that he really screwed up and
scared people.”194 A prosecutor in the Pacific region with twenty years
of experience recommended five days in jail and stated that, “While the
action alarmed people, no physical harm was done. Def[endant] has no
record, and was upset. I would treat this as a first time offense with 5
days to hold him accountable for people alarmed.”195 A junior
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended ten days in
jail along with a $500 fine justified their decision as follows: “However,
displaying a knife in a crowded public place could have lead to
disastrous results. If someone in the station had a gun they could have
started shooting and people could have been seriously injured; so some
190 Others thought lengthier jail sentences were warranted given that a knife was
present, which posed a significant danger to the public.
191 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1dppadxVwNC87y4”).
192 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1M0uK0fZrWhYZy0”).
193 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“37YCgT0SiaW44Hn”).
194 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3ffs4br7zUlfhjM”).
195 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“cU7oPuA7D1FidVL”).
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jail time is necessary to make him understand the seriousness of his
actions. However, given that he cooperated with police, immediately
handing over the knife, and never actually brandished the knife at
anyone, I do not feel that an excessive amount of jail time is necessary.
Just enough time to make him think.”196
Some respondents who thought a short stay in jail would teach the
defendant a lesson recommended a term of confinement that was more
severe than others. A junior prosecutor in the Pacific region
recommended sixty days in jail and wrote, “As for consequences, I find
this serious as he used a deadly weapon to scare multiple people and
even went so far to grab a woman’s arm. . . . But, these facts are
mitigated by no criminal history even after being [over] 18 for 10 years,
cooperative with police officers, no physical injuries, and no pointing
the knife at any person. So, some actual jail time to impart seriousness
of his conduct but minimal with hope that those 60 days will scare him
straight.”197
Other respondents seemed to use jail as a lesson both for the
defendant and others in hopes of a deterrent effect. A head prosecutor
with 1.5 years of experience in the Mountain region who recommended
ten days of confinement and a $1,000 monetary penalty asserted that,
“The knife and assault are both significant factors to me. People were
literally endangered by the actions of Mr. [Johnson] and that kind of
behavior, though apparently the first time Mr. Johnson exhibited such
behavior, deserves a strong message: If you commit a felony that literally
endangers the lives of others, the State takes those actions seriously.”198
Similarly, a midcareer head prosecutor in the West North Central region
who recommended thirty days in jail plus a $500 fine reasoned, “I don’t
believe a severe penalty is warranted . . . [but] there needs to be
sufficient response to deter others from committing similar acts and for
the public to have confidence that people who cause these kinds of
disturbances will be dealt with appropriately.”199 A junior prosecutor in
the Mountain region who recommended thirty days of confinement
plus an unspecified fine wrote, “This case presents a public safety issue
that I believe would require a jail sentence to send a message to the
196 See
supra Part
“9nkNyDE62rjUAdb”).
197 See
supra Part
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198 See
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community that this is the type of behavior we as a society will not
tolerate.”200 Others, however, thought that confinement was
inappropriate given no evidence of a prior criminal record and the cost
of confinement. An experienced head prosecutor in the South Atlantic
region wrote, “A sentence of confinement also does not serve justice as
this defendant has no prior record and the taxpayer would be bearing
the ultimate burden.”201
Overall, a surprisingly large number of prosecutors opted to choose
jail time as a tool to teach the defendant a lesson, although some did
this to deter others from similar behavior.
5.

Plea Bargaining Motivations and Strategies

Plea negotiations were mentioned by seventy-one respondents when
explaining their charging decisions and punishment recommendations.
Respondents were thinking about a variety of factors when discussing
pleas, including dropping charges as a plea negotiation tool, building a
criminal history, leaving room for victim input, or pressing charges to
incentivize mental health or other treatment.
Some were considering the defendant’s possible future criminal
offenses and building a history. A head prosecutor with five years of
experience in the West North Central region who recommended a
suspended sentence and no monetary penalty stated, “I would . . . try to
get a plea to the felony (at the expense of dismissing the misdemeanors),
as that would enhance the criminal history score in the future were
there to be another incident.”202
Other respondents who were considering possible future criminal
offenses were willing to offer a plea to a lesser charge if the defendant
could stay out of trouble for a period of time. One prosecutor in the
Mountain region with twenty years of experience who recommended a
suspended sentence and a year of probation commented, “I would
charge the disorderly conduct, one count, for the disruption of the train
station’s activity and for frightening people, and offer him a
misdemeanor resolution if he can stay out of trouble for 12 months.”203

200 See
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Other respondents were oriented more toward the defendant’s past
(lack of) criminal history when considering plea deals. A junior
prosecutor from the West North Central region who would charge
disorderly conduct and assault and recommended a suspended sentence
and no fine wrote, “I’d probably dismiss one through plea negotiations
due to the defendant’s lack of history.”204
Several respondents wanted to make plea decisions based on the
victim’s input. An experienced prosecutor in the South Atlantic region
who recommended a $1,000 penalty wrote, “I would charge the felony
but, if the victim consents, be willing to let the defendant plea to a
misdemeanor.”205 Another prosecutor in the South Atlantic region with
over 30 years of experience who recommended a $500 fine wrote, “I
would also consult with the woman he grabbed . . . to get her input and
explain both my charging decision and recommendation on a plea.”206
A Midwest prosecutor with over twenty-five years of experience who
recommended no confinement and a suspended fine wrote, “This is
merely a charging decision fitting the facts. I’d certainly be willing to
bargain it down (depending on what the victim says).”207 And an
experienced head prosecutor in the Mountain region who
recommended ten to twenty days of confinement emphasized that the
victim’s consent was necessary to offering a plea to lesser charges,
remarking, “The knife is the most concerning part of this episode, so
we start with the felonies, probably plead it to matching misdemeanors
due to his criminal history IF victim agrees.”208
Some respondents who would charge a felony but later reduce the
charge through plea negotiations focused on what type of charge they
could prove. A midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who
recommended a suspended sentence observed, “Of all the permissible
charges, I found the most appropriate to be Disorderly Conduct, RCS
101(A)(3). Although this is a felony with a 6-month minimum, the
defendant’s conduct in brandishing is the most easily provable charge
given the provable evidence. I felt there was insufficient evidence to

204 See
supra Part
“1OZcZYZAjcr0REl”).
205 See
supra Part
“1hYKWoxomAlba6D”).
206 See
supra Part
“3vXprex7ZdGAkXn”).
207 See
supra Part
“2TTAkTG008EY2SZ”).
208 See
supra Part
“2UhfeWdt5hFarHS”).
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prove Harassment, Endangerment, Criminal Nuisance, Aggravated
Assault, and Loitering. In fact, I believe Assault would even be difficult
to prove in light of the intent required, and I did not believe that there
would be sufficient witnesses for Public Nuisance. Thus, I would charge
the felony Disorderly Conduct and likely reduce it to the misdemeanor
Disorderly Conduct with a suspended jail and monetary sentence.”209
Some respondents used plea bargaining as an incentive for the
offender to obtain necessary social and behavioral services. A junior
New England prosecutor who recommended a suspended sentence
stated, “This is an individual who, under an emotional circumstance,
made a bad decision that scared individuals around him. I would charge
him with disorderly conduct, with the intent that he comply with
treatment--either anger management or other therapy. Depending on
his demeanor and level of remorse, I may also require him to complete
some community service. If compliant, I would likely drop the case.”210
Others noted that flexibility in the plea negotiation process best
served justice. Many respondents would bring multiple charges or
charge a felony in order to get the offender to plea to fewer or lesser
charges in the process of negotiating a plea.211 One midcareer
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a fine
between $250 and $500 observed, “By bringing three charges of varying
degrees, we can ultimately make the plea recommendation/offer that
best serves the interests of justice in a particular case. For instance, we
can later dismiss the felony and proceed on the two misdemeanors if
that’s what is appropriate. Or plea to the felony and merge in the
misdemeanors if that’s appropriate.”212 A junior prosecutor in the
Mountain region who recommended a suspended sentence and $500
fine stated, “When I screen for charges, I usually charge the maximum

209 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3e2EUSnam1S1pNM”).
210 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1pPrJAcwuMfmx7n”).
211 Several respondents specifically mentioned charging with the intent of dropping
some charges or reducing the severity of the charges in negotiation with the defendant
and the defense attorney. Twenty-nine respondents stated that they would charge a
felony but allow the defendant to plead to a misdemeanor. Three respondents would
select multiple charges but offer a plea to one felony charge in favor of dropping
additional misdemeanor charges. Five respondents would charge multiple
misdemeanors but allow the defendant to plead to a single misdemeanor charge. Ten
respondents indicated that they would charge multiple counts at various levels in order
to expand plea options.
212 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1Gv1DBSu5pkIpv6”).
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charges that I can and then in resolving the case a lot of it will depend
[on] input from the victim and also how the defendant willingness to
accept responsibility in regards to his actions and whether or not they
have taken any steps before hand to address the issue.”213 And a New
England head prosecutor with over thirty years of experience who
recommended ninety days in jail noted, “Despite being able to articulate
a felony would work to get a misdemeanor plea as that represents the
best balance of the public interest--a sanction which both punishes and
has specific and general deterrence and a means of responding to further
bad conduct (suspended sentences). No monetary fine. Not a fan of
financial penalties--for those with means-largely meaningless--for those
without means do not pay and ends up being largely meaningless.”214
Some respondents felt that prosecutors should bring more serious
charges first to provide flexibility later, although they often noted that
they did not think felony charges were warranted. An experienced
prosecutor in the Pacific region who recommended a suspended
sentence and no fine wrote, “In general, find the most serious charge
for which there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is far easier to
plea bargain down to reach a result consistent with justice than it is to
seek higher charges down the road.”215 Similarly, a prosecutor with over
twenty years of experience in the East South Central region who
recommended a suspended sentence and a $500 fine per charge
asserted, “A person should generally be charged with the most serious
offense possible under the applicable laws and fact scenario. A part of
being a good prosecutor, in my opinion, is having the wisdom and good
judgment to know when to be harsh and when to be lenient. It is much
easier to allow a plea to a lesser offense and more lenient sentence than
the other way. Bottom line . . . you can always come down when
warranted but you can’t go up.”216 An experienced prosecutor in the
West North Central region who did not recommend any punishment
wrote, “Filing felony gives room to negotiate down to misdemeanor.”217
A midcareer South Atlantic prosecutor who recommended two years of

213 See
supra Part
“Pv5NlSSORbxgo6d”).
214 See
supra Part
“DtKKOTQKW2jqYrT”).
215 See
supra Part
“22LnvkbHZ23SO8j”).
216 See
supra Part
“1FLrbaCBhwntCR0”).
217 See
supra Part
“2eUUV96m9DbvQ4B”).
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probation and a $1,000 fine wrote, “I would charge all if not several of
the offenses in order to have charges to dismiss in the negotiation of the
plea. I also tend to overcharge, because I can’t add charges later, but I
can dismiss charges any time.”218
Others thought that bringing multiple charges was a waste of time,
however. One junior Midwest prosecutor who recommended a year in
jail wrote, “I am charging the felonious assault and the lesser included
misdemeanor assault. It is a waste of time to charge the nonassaultive
charges because they would likely be dismissed anyway as part of a plea
deal.”219
Still, other respondents felt that more serious charges should only be
brought if the defendant was uncooperative in the process of plea
negotiations. An experienced Midwest prosecutor who recommended a
suspended sentence and suspended fine wrote, “I would charge the
minimum charge necessary to get the goal desired, that being probation
(or suspended sentence). If the defendant would not accept that plea
and sentence, then I would most likely dismiss the case and reissue it
with all the charges that apply, including the felony for recklessly
displaying the knife.”220 A midcareer prosecutor in the Midwest region
who recommended a suspended sentence and probation wrote, “I
would charge him with disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor level. In
making that decision, although noting that his conduct could properly
fit a felony disorderly conduct (while armed with a dangerous weapon),
I also take into consideration his lack of prior record, his cooperation
and de-escalation of the situation when law enforcement arrived, and
his motivation for conducting himself in this manner. . . . I would be
seeking probation (a suspended sentence) to determine if any mental
health or substance abuse issues existed. . . . Should this defendant
choose to take this case to trial, however, I would likely re-file the case
with at least one felony count, as it would indicate to me that he has no
interest in taking accountability for his actions and is not likely to selfcorrect in the future.”221 A junior Midwest prosecutor who
recommended a suspended sentence wrote, “Only charging Assault and
Battery would be my initial charge, but if defendant was not willing to
218 See
supra Part
“1Ebb2k2zfpVExqE”).
219 See
supra Part
“em70J75SKNIj1jH”).
220 See
supra Part
“OAVTkT3Y9YHKjkJ”).
221 See
supra Part
“OdsAgLolLBZChAl”).
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plea on that count and insisted on a trial, there would likely be more
charges at trial - any charges supported by the evidence necessarily
presented regarding the Assault and Battery.”222
Overall, many prosecutors reported filing charges against the
defendant without the desire to have the defendant serve the time
associated with the charges, but to instead use charges as a negotiation
tool or to build a criminal history.
C. General Decision-Making Process
After the respondents answered questions about the vignette, we then
asked respondents about how prosecutors in their office make charging
decisions. We asked who makes the charging decision, whether the
crime is a felony or misdemeanor changes the decision-making process,
who prosecutes the case after decisions are made about charging, and
whether their office has internal guidelines or standards governing
charging decisions. We present their responses to these survey
questions as well as qualitative analysis of any additional comments
they provided below. Notably, the vast majority of prosecutors
(seventy-two percent) made charging and plea bargaining decisions
alone, and the majority (fifty-seven percent) even prosecuted the cases
without any input from another prosecutor.
1.

Responsibility for Charging/Plea Bargaining Decisions and
Prosecution

We were interested in knowing about prosecutors’ charging and pleabargaining process. We asked respondents about how “the decision as
to charging and plea bargaining [would] be made in [their] office.” The
vast majority of respondents (392, or 72.46%), indicated that a frontline prosecutor would make the decision alone. Sixty-five respondents
(12.01%) indicated that a front-line prosecutor would decide after
consulting with a superior. Seven respondents (1.29%) indicated that a
front-line prosecutor would advise a superior and he or she would make
the decision. One respondent (.18% of respondents) indicated that a
committee or board of prosecutors would make a collective decision
without the front-line prosecutor involved. Two respondents (.37% of
respondents) indicated that a committee or board of prosecutors would
make a collective decision with the front-line prosecutor involved.

222 See
supra Part
“23WB53au1jQynSK”).
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Seventy-four respondents (13.68%) selected “other,”223 of which fifteen
respondents indicated that the police make the initial charging decision
in their jurisdiction, and six respondents were the only prosecutor in
their office.
We next asked respondents whether “the screening process change[s]
if the crime is a felony rather than a misdemeanor?” One hundred and
sixty (29.63% of respondents) said yes, and 380 (70.37% of
respondents) said no.
Finally, we asked respondents “After the initial charging decision is
made, what happens to the case?” One hundred and forty-seven
respondents (27.22%) indicated that the case is assigned to another
attorney who has discretion to change the charges. Nine respondents
(1.67%) indicated that the case is assigned to another attorney who does
not have discretion to change the charges. Three hundred and nine
respondents (57.22%) indicated that the attorney who makes the
charging decision prosecutes the case. Seventy-five respondents

223 We asked respondents who selected “other” to explain the charging and plea
bargaining process for their office. Twenty-five respondents reported that one person
handles charges while another person handles sentencing recommendations or plea
negotiations. Eleven respondents reported that charges and plea negotiations may be
managed differently depending on the case specifics or the prosecutor’s experience.
Eleven respondents reported that the front-line prosecutor has discretion but may
consult others. Nine respondents reported charging decisions are made by a screening
department or warrant writer. Six respondents reported that they are in a oneprosecutor office and that all decisions are handled by that prosecutor. Six respondents
reported that they are in a small office where each individual manages their own cases
independently but has the option to consult. Six respondents reported that a prosecutor
makes the final charging decision after consulting a superior, police, or any victims.
Four respondents reported that police make the charging decisions but that they may
consult or be reviewed. Three respondents reported that a prosecutor would propose
charges that would be approved by a supervisor before being considered official. Three
respondents reported that a supervisor or more experienced prosecutor would make the
charging decision. Two respondents reported that the front-line prosecutor handles the
case from beginning to end. Two respondents reported that a front-line prosecutor
usually makes decisions alone. One respondent reported that a prosecutor would make
the charging decision alone but would then staff the case with coworkers and maybe
supervisors. One respondent reported that a prosecutor makes the charging decision
based on supervisor’s guidelines and priorities. One respondent reported that they
would recommend deferred prosecution in this particular case, which is typically
approved by a judge. One respondent reported that a prosecutor would decide after
consulting peers. One respondent reported that prosecutors only need supervisor
approval when negotiating to drop charges in a case with a formal indictment. One
respondent reported that all plea bargain offers must be approved by a supervisor. One
respondent reported that the final charging decision is made by a committee. Twentyone of these respondents are included in multiple of the above categories.

2188

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:2133

(13.89%) selected other.224 Of the respondents who selected other,
thirty-three explained that the case is reassigned to a prosecutor who
has at least partial discretion over the charges.225
In sum, our study revealed that prosecutors typically acted alone in
charging and prosecuting the cases that came before them.
2.

Internal Guidelines or Standards

Slightly over half of prosecutors we surveyed had internal guidelines
they were able to follow in making charging decisions. Specifically, we
asked respondents whether their “office [has] internal guidelines or
standards that dictate how prosecutors make charging decisions?”
Forty-seven respondents (8.74%) indicated that their office has
224 We asked respondents who selected “other” to explain. Fifteen respondents
reported that some cases are reassigned, and some are not. Eleven reported that what
happens next depends on the case. Six respondents reported that the prosecution
process is fluid and that cases are not assigned. Five respondents reported that a
supervisor would assign the case and that some decisions require supervisor approval.
Five respondents reported that misdemeanors are reassigned, but felonies are not. Five
respondents reported that an attorney is assigned to a courtroom rather than a case.
Four respondents reported that police usually handle the charging, and then the case
moves to a prosecutor. Three respondents reported that they are in a one-person office.
Three respondents reported that case assignment varies based on prosecutors’ caseload.
Two respondents reported that misdemeanors are not reassigned. Two respondents
reported that what happens next depends on the experience level of the prosecutor.
Two respondents reported that cases are assigned randomly. Two respondents reported
that the case is handled by any prosecutor until assigned for trial. Two respondents
reported that the case is assigned to someone in the designated unit/team. Two
respondents reported that an assigned attorney must consult to make changes. Two
respondents reported that all cases go to a docket where prosecutors can make offers to
take the cases they want. One respondent reported that usually the charging attorney
prosecutes the case, but not always. One respondent reported that the screening
prosecutor is a rotating position, and the screener may or may not continue with any
given case. One respondent reported that the office reviews felony charges together and
the supervisor has the final say. One respondent reported that what happens next
depends on the office prosecution model. One respondent reported that the case is
reassigned to a prosecutor who reviews with a panel. One respondent reported that the
case is continued to allow the defendant to apply for a program. One respondent
reported that the assigned attorney makes charging decisions except for cases with incustody defendants. One respondent reported that they use “horizontal prosecution,”
and one reported, “Pros at PE handles case.”
225 Five respondents reported that a second prosecutor may need to secure additional
approval. Three respondents reported that while the police choose initial charges, the
assigned prosecutor does have some discretion. Two respondents reported that there
would need to be a review with a panel. One respondent clarified that discretion is for
misdemeanor charges only. One respondent indicated that charges must be clearly
noted in the filing documents. One respondent clarified that charges cannot be directly
changed, but that the prosecutor does have discretion to offer plea deals.
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mandatory internal guidelines or standards that prosecutors must
follow when making charging decisions. Two hundred and twenty-four
respondents (45.35%) indicated that their office has internal guidelines
or standards that prosecutors should consider when making charging
decisions, but following them is not necessary. Two hundred and fortyseven respondents (45.91%) indicated that their office does not have
internal guidelines or standards and each prosecutor decides based on
their best judgment. Overall, most prosecutors had some guidelines,
(though 45.9% had no guidelines at all) and those who did, only a small
number (8.7%) indicated that they were mandatory.
We then asked respondents, “If your office has internal guidelines or
standards, what do they state in regards to charging?” Thirty
respondents referenced ABA standards (either explicitly or by listing the
standards), twenty referenced NDAA standards (either explicitly or by
listing the standards), forty-four referenced “reasonable likelihood of
success at trial/reasonable likelihood of conviction,” forty-nine
referenced “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 18 mentioned “probable
cause.”
Some respondents conveyed that they had office policies but declined
to provide them. For some who declined to provide their office
guidelines, the reason was that it was impracticable to do so because of
length. One representative comment from a head prosecutor with three
years of experience in the Pacific region was, “Too long to summarize
here.”226 Others offered only generalities about their office policies
because they were proprietary. One experienced Midwest prosecutor
stated, “Proprietary. Generally, we make these decisions considering the
history, mental health, prior criminal justice contacts, wishes of the
victims (if any), whether there was use of the dangerous weapon, any
injuries.”227
In sum, although internal guidance exists for prosecutors it was rarely
mandatory, nor did the majority of offices provide specific guidance on
severity or uniformity of charging. The remainder of this Part will
describe common themes from responses about what guidelines and
standards govern prosecutor decision making.

226 See
supra Part
“3oKE8dV9z6cMcj7”).
227 See
supra Part
“x90A01qQcVzPBhD”).
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Guidelines and Discretion

Several respondents mentioned that their guidelines varied by type of
crime. One midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region noted that
their office has “a grid that determines charging and punishment.”228 A
head prosecutor with one year of experience in the Mountain region
wrote, “Our standards are specific to types of crimes. For example,
domestic violence, sexual assault and child endangerment are always
charged as initially reported by the victim or witness. Nonviolent
felonies may be considered for deferral prior to charging. The charging
decision on most misdemeanors and infractions are left to the discretion
of the law enforcement officer who handled the report or
investigation.”229 An experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “We only
have policies/guidelines related to certain types of cases when certain
facts are present that dictate how we should charge. Otherwise,
charging is up to each individual prosecutor based on each individual
case and facts.”230 Other respondents gave very detailed descriptions of
their standards and how they varied by crimes.231
Others noted that while they did have guidelines for some types of
crimes, they did not have guidelines for every type of crime. For
example, a midcareer prosecutor in the Pacific region conveyed, “We
do not have policies for every single crime, and I believe it would be

228 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2ygdO54RqothmzR”).
229 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2PbQ5POBrZDWUEZ”).
230 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1GKA1oBnEhWLD5z”).
231 For example, one respondent conveyed, “Parameters are in place for charging
drunk driving cases, plea bargaining those cases. Above a .17 BAC is charged as a “super
drunk driving case” no reductions if .20 BAC or higher. No reductions for drunk driving
4th or greater offenses. No reductions if a police officer is injured by a defendant that
resists. No plea bargaining when an officer is the victim unless the officer has been
consulted. All intimate partner crimes are charged as a domestic violence crime. Victims
are always to be consulted with on all crimes of violence, and their input considered on
how to go forward on the case. All sexual assault crimes should result in sex offender
registry. All sexual assault crimes against children should result in a significant prison
sentence absent extraordinary circumstances (e.g., the child is unable to testify, or
testimony would cause more harm to the child). All felony habitual offenders are to be
charged as habitual offenders - the habitual offender enhancement can be used as part
of the plea bargaining process. All serious felony charges with penalties greater than 10
years are reviewed and considered collaboratively with the assistant prosecutor
reviewing and charging and either myself (the elected prosecuting attorney) or my Chief
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney.” See supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent
identified as “1cV4mes3i9GlAec”).
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impossible to establish rigid guidelines for all charging decisions given
all of the factors involved in a criminal case. But we do have guidelines
regarding certain types of cases. For example, certain types of felony
drug possession cases are generally charged as misdemeanors if an
individual has a clean record.”232 A junior prosecutor in the Mountain
region stated, “There are few such guidelines. They mostly are tied to
specific types of cases i.e., domestic violence or DUI. However, we have
an open door policy and you must be able to defend your decisions and
are expected to get feedback when in doubt.”233 An experienced
Midwest prosecutor wrote, “Standards are in place for particular crimes
such as assaults, drunk driving and sexual offenses involving children.
Otherwise the charging attorney has discretion to decide as to the
appropriate charge and possible plea resolution.”234
Others noted that while they have guidelines, prosecutors have
discretion to vary from them. A head prosecutor with thirty years of
experience in the Mountain region commented, “We have a charging
manual, but most of our prosecutors are aware of how we do things and
the younger prosecutors are trained by the more experienced
prosecutors and often go to the more experienced attorneys for advice.
We give our prosecutors a lot of discretion.”235 An experienced Midwest
prosecutor wrote, “They are charge specific and just guidelines.”236 A
head New England prosecutor with over thirty years of experience
stated, “There is a prosecutor desk book that essentially affords
prosecutors discretion in charging that varies with the offense, history
of the defendant, victim’s input, cooperation and willingness of the
defendant to cooperate with programs and services offered. We try to
distinguish between those who are dangerous and/or have victimized
others and are likely to do so again and those who need services and
direction.”237 A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region

232 See
supra Part
“1cTCrl3cCHb3v7U”).
233 See
supra Part
“3pl3nr41h0seVLa”).
234 See
supra Part
“1l06TsfOk2sCZg6”).
235 See
supra Part
“003A5Y3MaA50FGN”).
236 See
supra Part
“3IVQKjTjDG3uvA5”).
237 See
supra Part
“3fK9cOcsv1ziWOw”).
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characterized their office guidelines as “more of a tool and benchmark
to go off of on the average case.”238
Others noted that their only guideline was to follow relevant state
statutes, and beyond this, they had discretion in charging decisions. An
experienced Midwest prosecutor commented, “It is discretionary for the
charging prosecutor unless mandated by statute.”239 Similarly, a
Midwest prosecutor with over twenty-five years of experience stated,
“We are to comply with statutory victim rights.”240 A head prosecutor
with twenty-five years of experience in the South Atlantic region stated,
“There are certain offenses for which a minimum sentence is statutorily
mandated. The prosecutor must, of course, follow the law, but can work
around mandatory minimums by agreeing to reduce the charges.”241
And one experienced Midwest prosecutor stated that their “standards
mimic those in the State ethics guidelines for prosecutors.”242
In sum, prosecutors noted that guidelines were distinct for separate
crimes and that they could depart from them as long as they followed
state statutes.
b.

Standards and Discretion

Some respondents described their general office policy for making
charging decisions.243 One junior prosecutor in the Mountain region
stated, “Screen conservatively, prosecute aggressively. Consult with
victims prior to charging. Run potentially controversial cases by a

238 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“3jdPL9lSBtFGYcI”).
239 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1gi3bL7DMPuNlSW”).
240 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“6yWsvpetDU9xdm1”).
241 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1GJLZzYkrYhj1Us”).
242 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1kOJFjJaCivn9Cc”).
243 Other respondents offered their personal philosophy on making charging
decisions, and it was not clear if this was dictated by office policy. For example, one
respondent wrote: “Usually, I look at the big picture, meaning I look at the person,
where they are in life, criminal history, if any, if I think this is an isolated incident or
just next in a pattern of established behaviors. I check to see if anyone was hurt, because
that changes the analysis immediately. If I believe this person will respond well to the
county committing resources to help them get help and address the behaviors exhibited.
Stuff like that.” See supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“37YCgT0SiaW44Hn”).
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superior.”244 Another Mountain region prosecutor with almost 30 years
of experience wrote, “We have guidelines that are a loose set of charging
objectives in place to make ad hoc decisions. / We must consider a
person’s criminal history. / Is he a frequent flyer or is this his first entry
into the criminal justice system. / Is he a 1%er, someone from whom
society needs protection, or a knucklehead exercising poor judgment,
bad decision making, or drug/alcohol induced poor decision making. /
Sometimes a crime may be a felony but we can achieve all out objectives
by charging and prosecuting a misdemeanor. / These are illustrative not
exhaustive.”245
Many noted that their standards were not in writing. One midcareer
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region noted, “The guidelines and
standards are not written and are otherwise informal. [B]asically we are
to charge what is appropriate and not overcharge. We are to keep in
mind that any plea negotiations begin, meaning the maximum, is what
is charged and goes down from there.”246 A junior prosecutor in the
South Atlantic region mentioned that the lack of a formal, written
standard did not result in inconsistency because of strong informal
standards. They wrote, “We do not have any formal standards but do
often consult with other prosecutors and the District Attorney in
sensitive, unique, or high profile cases. Due to this, although we don’t
have any kind of sentencing grid, broadly speaking, charging decisions
are consistent from ADA to ADA.”247
Several respondents offered standards that were directions to charge
based on the crime committed or the strength of the evidence. One
prosecutor with over thirty years of experience in the Pacific region
stated their office policy was to “Charge the most serious charges legally
supported by the evidence.”248 Similarly, one Midwest prosecutor with
over thirty years of experience stated, “Nothing specified. The
prosecutors are told to charge the offenses they think are appropriate,
given the facts of the case.”249 A head prosecutor with ten years of
244 See
supra Part II.A (quoting
“2rNPtxgBCYyTVCy”).
245 See
supra Part II.A (quoting
“piy4wNGg1fxxCX7”).
246 See
supra Part II.A (quoting
“1Ebb2k2zfpVExqE”).
247 See
supra Part II.A (quoting
“ONfAJ9mo394BPfH”).
248 See supra Part II.A.Sample (quoting
“1Fy4wM0BXBb9sIL”).
249 See
supra Part II.A (quoting
“6spx6z1v46eC2MV”).
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experience in the Mountain region wrote, “We charge the crimes
committed.”250 A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region
commented, “[M]ake charging decisions based off of warrants unless
frivolous charges appear that cannot be proven.”251 An experienced
South Atlantic prosecutor stated, “generally, all charges supported by
the facts should be charged, however, there is more discretion in serious
cases where the question is about lesser-included counts.”252 A head
prosecutor with ten years of experience in the Mountain region wrote,
“Charge conservatively, taking into account any obvious defenses and
suppression issues.”253
Some respondents reported guidance to avoid felony charges when
possible, however. One Midwest head prosecutor with over twenty
years of experience stated, “We try to avoid felony charges if possible
based upon youth, lack of prior record, etc. We also choose
misdemeanors over felonies when the circumstances of the crime
simply do not arise to level of what are classified as “serious” crimes
(felony).”254
Some respondents connected their charging guidance to the plea
process. Several respondents had office policies against overcharging.
An experienced prosecutor in the Mountain region stated, “We do not
charge counts just to use them for plea negotiations. we charge based
on the facts.”255 A midcareer Mountain prosecutor noted that
“[c]harging should be done based off of the criminal statutes and
charges should not be stacked for the purposes of pleas or early
disposition.”256 An experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “Never
overcharge a defendant with the idea of plea bargaining later. Consult
victim and police in making a charging decision. Charge defendant

250 See
supra Part
“RLjdGodNjRrbNYd”).
251 See
supra Part
“2wSTRnUGha7OmYb”).
252 See
supra Part
“2fuMrAvhdIYjxpU”).
253 See
supra Part
“2tsATdOdSiOWfnY”).
254 See
supra Part
“2cwSapyYo0BVvRm”).
255 See
supra Part
“1FkAV3ofh5Zhywz”).
256 See
supra Part
“2uvTIKvSDsF1etw”).
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fairly.”257 Another midcareer Midwest prosecutor commented, “In
general, our office has a policy that if a felony is charged, then the
prosecutor must seek a felony conviction. There are exceptions, of
course, but in general the idea is that we do not want to charge high just
to get misdemeanor convictions and bully our way into convictions.”258
Not all standards were against overcharging, however. Some
respondents noted the need for flexibility in the plea-bargaining
process. One junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region wrote, “My
office’s policy is to take a good look at the evidence, evaluate its
strengths and weaknesses, then to reach out to witnesses to seek any
clarifications necessary. Once that is done, only the most pertinent
charges are brought. For instance, if a Defendant is charged with a
serious felony offense and multiple misdemeanors, our policy is to
evaluate whether those additional misdemeanors need to be charged in
light of the substantial penalty a Defendant may face due to the felony.
However, sometimes misdemeanor offenses will also be charged to leave
room for compromise resolutions, whether that be after trial or during
the plea negotiation stage.”259
Several respondents indicated that their office standards were based
on fairness and equality considerations. An experienced Midwest
prosecutor noted that in their office, “we try to treat all cases equally,”260
and a midcareer Mountain prosecutor stated a similar principle: “There
are ethical considerations-- ensure that Defendants are treated equally
if they are similarly situated. No hard and fast rules, but common
sense.”261 A midcareer prosecutor in the Mountain region stated, “That
we should be consistent in our approach to types of cases, so as to
discourage prosecutor-shopping.”262 Another midcareer Mountain
prosecutor wrote, “The general standard is to prosecute from the end
result we are seeking. In other words, we look at a case and determine
what a fair outcome would be for all the parties involved and then we

257 See
supra Part
“D2A6SFg8jypwfgB”).
258 See
supra Part
“OdsAgLolLBZChAl”).
259 See
supra Part
“2tn5rzJYkR7XZi9”).
260 See
supra Part
“24O9B10bmlHw1EE”).
261 See
supra Part
“2dNgXnBxUUXSYF2”).
262 See
supra Part
“w74IJ0Ny7LSxLm9”).
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make a decision of what charges to file.”263 An experienced prosecutor
in the West North Central region wrote that, “Generally, case must be
supported by evidence and not based on gender or race etc.”264 A
prosecutor with twenty years of experience in the Middle Atlantic
region stated their office policy was, “Do not overcharge. Do not
consider race, sex, national origin, “political” connections, etc. Decision
should be fact-driven only.”265
Others indicated that their standards were based on public safety and
criminal history considerations. A head prosecutor with seven years of
experience in the West North Central region commented, “Public safety
is the highest priority. Consideration should be given to the level of
threat to public safety, followed by criminal history.”266 An experienced
Midwest prosecutor noted, “We should charge the repeater if the
defendant qualifies, add the enhancers if they are available, etc.”267 A
junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region stated, “It greatly
depends on the person[’s] criminal history. If the person is a convicted
felon, our office will as[k] for some confinement time depending on the
charges and the facts. If the person does not have criminal history we
can justify a lesser sentence or reduction in criminal charges.”268
Others who did not list standards or guidelines in the above categories
summarized a succinct, overarching standard or philosophy their office
used. These were varied. One midcareer prosecutor in the Mountain
region offered the following standard: “Do the right thing. Do the smart
thing. Remember who you are fighting for.”269 A head prosecutor with
over forty years of experience in the South Atlantic region said their
standard was, “Just do the right thing. Everything else will take care of
itself.”270 A Midwest prosecutor with almost thirty years of experience
263 See
supra Part
“1DTQACcZXRf7kIA”).
264 See
supra Part
“3L523va4yWJiK0Y”).
265 See
supra Part
“3sbLDcTJvacgrk9”).
266 See
supra Part
“3j6izMimI0astZ3”).
267 See
supra Part
“1MRPoGOb3j9HOsr”).
268 See
supra Part
“3CC4Kr7OlPAyEhC”).
269 See
supra Part
“ebOKc7b4o9jGwkV”).
270 See
supra Part
“3kAphSI2HN019pT”).
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said, “Use best judgment and do what is best for all. As a misdemeanor,
it would be a quick decision, and rarely subject to review.”271 A New
England head prosecutor with over thirty years of experience wrote,
“Use discretion, don’t embarrass the office.”272
Other respondents provided a list of standards that do not fit neatly
into the above-described categories. One head prosecutor with three
years of experience in the Mountain region wrote the following: “defendants are citizens / -overcriminalization is a problem / -criminal
justice overlap with juvenile justice deserves special concern so the
state’s aims do not conflict / -marijuana possession (no kids, not in
school zones, not for delivery) is NOT a major concern / -protect the
public -- especially crimes of violence / -prosecute elder abuse.”273
Prosecutors listed various standards like conservatively screening
cases, consulting with victims, and running controversial cases by
superiors, and some also noted that standards were not in writing. Many
prosecutors focused on public safety and criminal history
considerations, along with fairness and equality. Others were focused
on flexibility in charging, and some noted overcharging as a problem.
c.

Supervision and Discretion

Several respondents reported needing to consult with a supervisor,
and one junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region reported that
“[i]f a newer ADA, charging decisions would be verified/approved by
the intake supervising ADA.”274 A midcareer Mountain prosecutor
reported, “Any case that is or has the potential to be in the news must
be cleared with administration first.”275
One elected West North Central prosecutor with over thirty years of
experience wrote that their judgment was the office’s standard. “Our
office is relatively small, with six prosecutors. As the elected District
Attorney, I closely monitor charging decisions and let my Assistants
know if I disapprove of them. I guess you might say I am the internal
guideline and standard. I give my Assistants broad discretion and try
271 See
supra Part II.A
“3hA9R0UrOuys94H”).
272 See
supra Part II.A
“2pRJx02M7GC0NmW”).
273 See
supra Part II.A
“2X6bIzrmMPY4uyW”).
274 See
supra Part II.A
“Dr86WH64oyIJzDX”).
275 See
supra Part II.A
“26nWN6eRL3ENpGW”).
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not to micro-manage them. But I do let them know if I want a certain
situation handled in a particular manner, and if they undercharged or
overcharged a criminal situation.”276
3.

Information Important for Decision Making

We also asked prosecutors about what information is necessary for
them to make charging decisions. We asked, “Which of the following
pieces of information do you need in order to make a charging
decision?” and provided respondents twenty-eight pieces of
information. See Figure 7 to see what pieces of information were
important to respondents. The most commonly selected answers (at
least seventy-five percent of respondents selected) included: severity of
personal injuries, use of weapons, severity of property damage, suspect’s
behavior, number of victims, presence of weapons, suspect’s prior
convictions, age of victims, presence of illegal drugs, and use of illegal
drugs.277
276 See
supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“1NfbKTl5Y1vHq0p”).
277 Twenty-four respondents (4.43 percent) said that they needed to know the
suspect’s race prior to making a charging decision. When respondents selected this, we
asked them to “[p]lease explain why you consider the suspect’s race when making a
charging decision.” There were three reasons respondents listed for needing the
suspect’s race.
First, prosecutors (thirteen) indicated that they needed this information to determine
whether there was a potential hate crime. One junior Midwest prosecutor wrote, “If the
suspect’s race is different from the victim’s I would evaluate whether there was any
element of it being some type of hate crime.” See supra Part II.A (quoting anonymous
respondent identified as “AFE8q1FuQ1jp9Rf”). A head prosecutor with over twenty
years of experience in the West North Central region noted, “Because depending on the
crime committed, the motive of the crime and/or the race, gender, sexuality, religious
affiliation, ethnicity of the victim, the offender can be charged with committing a Hate
Crime under [state] Law. If there is no evidence of a hate crime then the suspect’s race
is completely immaterial and never considered in any way shape or form.” See supra
Part II.A. (quoting anonymous respondent identified as “24dTHmFe2aDnMRs”).
Second, prosecutors (twelve) indicated that this information is standard biographical
and identifying information. As one experienced prosecutor in the Pacific region noted,
“We’re required to input demographic information for identity purposes. That is the
only reason.” See supra Part II.A. (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“a5iODAu8fchBROV”). An experienced prosecutor in the South Atlantic region
commented that “we don’t consider it in making charging decisions, but we do mandate
that the screening attorney note it in our case management system.” Id. (quoting
anonymous respondent identified as “2fuMrAvhdIYjxpU”). Other respondents noted
that knowing the suspect’s race served multiple purposes. A Midwest prosecutor with
twenty-five years of experience wrote that “[i]t’s a required field for reporting purposes;
otherwise, it’s of no consequence in most cases; the sole exception would be for a charge
of ethnic intimidation (where the race of both the suspect and the victim would be
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We also provided space for respondents to write up to four additional
pieces of information relevant to their decision making. The most
common piece of information needed was input or information from
the victim (thirty-six respondents) followed by input or information
from witnesses (thirty).278 Other respondents (nineteen) reported that
the information they need is case-specific. Fifteen respondents reported
that they needed facts of the case, and fourteen needed more
information about the evidence (e.g., strength, quality). Twelve
respondents wrote that they need information about the suspect’s
mental health and psychiatric history, eleven need demographic
information to determine whether there is a hate crime or domestic
violence, eleven need information on the relationship between the
suspect and victim, ten need any known substance use/drug testing
results, and nine need the suspect’s criminal history and domestic
violence history. Eight report needing the suspect’s personal
information (for example, job, address, socioeconomic status, and
veteran status).279
noted).” See supra Part II.A. (quoting anonymous respondent identified as
“2RQGGKkKarI2xGl”). An experienced prosecutor in the Pacific region commented,
“We must consider everything. Race can be relevant in certain cases—identification and
racially motivated crimes are obvious examples.” See supra Part II.A. (quoting
anonymous respondent identified as “2BmJbHin4JYQwxU”).
Third, prosecutors (two) reported needing to know the suspect’s race because of the
potential for police misconduct. One midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region
noted, “There are racial inequities and I have dismissed cases because the only
“suspicious behavior’” has been the race of the person (i.e. a Hispanic male walking
across a park. He is stopped and searched. He has marijuana on him.) I dismiss cases
where the reason for the investigation is racially motivated. Also, law enforcement is
more likely to arrest a child of color than a white child. I am cognizant of these aspects
when evaluating the response of the adults as well as the children.” See supra Part II.A.
(quoting anonymous respondent identified as “1dnUmYZZr1R5LZi”).
278 A total of ninety-seven respondents indicated that they would consider the
victim’s input, which includes the thirty-six who supplied this information as part of
this question. And another sixty-one respondents noted victim’s input when explaining
their decision making for the case vignette or how their office makes decisions.
279 Seven report needing audio or video recordings of the incident, 911 call audio,
or news media reports. Seven report needing to know the defendant’s statement, intent,
or justification. Six need to know about the victim or witness reliability and criminal
history. Six need information on the search and seizure, Miranda issues, police
behavior, and investigation efforts. Three report needing information about
mitigating/aggravating factors. Three report needing information about pending/current
charges and whether the defendant is on probation. Three need medical records and
reports, and three need information about the cost of damage/theft. Two need probable
cause information, two need confidential informant status, and two need a risk
assessment (meaning an assessment of risk to the community). Each of the following
pieces of information was listed by one respondent: name of/information about suspect’s
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In sum, the most important information the vast majority (seventyfive percent) of respondents wanted included the severity of
injury/damage/weapons used, suspect’s behavior, number and age of
victims, prior criminal history and presence/use of drugs.

IV. DISCUSSION
This Section considers our results in light of questions of interest
about prosecutorial discretion and its effects — variability and severity
of charging, the relevance of internal and national guidance on

girlfriend, suspect’s status in the sex offender registry, “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
whether minors were present, whether there is corroboration, whether the defendant is
cooperating with law enforcement, whether there are accomplices/suspect’s degree of
participation in the crime, whether there is insurance coverage, and “reasonable
likelihood of success at trial.”
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prosecutorial discretion, and factors considered by prosecutors in
making a decision.
A. Severity and Variability
To understand disparities in criminal justice outcomes, it is key to
understand whether and how prosecutors’ decisions are driving those
outcomes. This study’s vignette design solves one of the key problems
with observational research — omitted variable bias. In particular, this
study held constant every aspect of the criminal behavior and police
conduct, including geographic differences and differences in conduct
and background. Prosecutorial discretion exists for a reason: each case
is distinctive and requires individualized attention. Yet, prior social
science work may fail to detect subtle variations in case factors, which
the study’s method holds constant. By holding all those other factors
constant, we can observe prosecutorial discretion itself.
We found remarkable severity in penalties imposed by some
prosecutors. 280 Recall that $500 was the most common fine imposed for
this situation, where no victim was injured, and no property was
damaged. Broad surveys of the U.S. population show that six out of ten
Americans do not have $500 in savings, which suggests that this fine
amount may be onerous. It would certainly be an amount an average fastfood worker (the occupation of the hypothetical defendant in some of
our vignettes) would be unlikely to pay, leading to other serious criminal
justice implications for an arguably minor offense. These serious
criminal charges can have devastating effects on an individual’s life.
Even more, recall that almost thirty percent of prosecutors
recommended jail time for an individual with no criminal record and
who seems to need short-term therapy or a cooling-down period. The
modal response was thirty days in jail, which would likely result in this
individual losing his job, and likely stable housing and family life (a
very small number of prosecutors did note a willingness to allow
confinement to be on weekends, however). This is a compelling finding
that a sample of prosecutors would recommend such a long jail term for
an individual who has certainly made a mistake but has not caused any
physical harm or property damage and does not have the risk factors of
being dangerous. Even aside from the effects on defendants and their
families, such incarceration also imposes onerous financial costs on the
government — amounting to $45,000 per year in some jurisdictions.281
280

Robertson et al., supra note 118, at 834.
See, e.g., Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee, 84 Fed.
Reg. 63,891, 63,891-92 (Nov. 19, 2019) (“Based on [Fiscal Year] 2018 data, [Fiscal
281
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Some of this severity may be due to plea bargaining strategies. Recall
that many respondents were unwilling to impose punishment given the
lack of harm to people or property and in light of the offender’s
perceived mental health issues. But several respondents noted in their
qualitative comments that they would bring multiple charges or more
severe charges in order to induce the defendant to plea guilty to fewer
or less severe charges or to accept mental health or substance abuse
treatment.282 Some respondents reported opposition to overcharging,
however, and reported only bringing charges they felt they could prove.
Future research should systematically study variation in prosecutors’
views on plea bargaining strategies.
Aside from the severity of sentences, the variability is also striking.
The Supreme Court has reiterated that the Constitution “requires that
all persons subjected to . . . legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in
the liabilities imposed.”283 Prosecutors nationally charged similarly
situated defendants who allegedly committed the same crime to varying
terms of two years of prison time, six months of jail time, down to thirty
days of jail time, or community service. Similarly, some prosecutors
charged defendants hefty fines of up to $5,000 and others $500 or much
lesser amounts of $250. All of this demonstrates that prosecutorial
discretion is indeed broad, largely unsupervised, and highly variable
and inconsistent. This is an important finding for those studying
prosecutors to consider as far as potential interventions.
Most of this variation was inexplicable. We did, however, observe
some correlations that merit further study. Prosecutors in some regions
of the country appear to be harsher than others — specifically
prosecutors in the West South Central and the Mountain regions.
Further exploration into the causes of variability are required.
Year] 2018 [Cost of Incarceration Fee] was $37,449.00 ($102.60 per day) for Federal
inmates in Bureau facilities.”); How Much Does it Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?:
California’s Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF.,
https://lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cj_inmatecost
(last
updated
Jan.
2019)
[https://perma.cc/DHB2-EB5U] (“It costs an average of about $81,000 per year to
incarcerate an inmate in prison in California.”); Beatrix Lockwood & Nicole Lewis, The
Hidden Cost of Incarceration, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-incarceration#:~:
text=The%20Bureau%20of%20Justice%20Statistics,2.3%20million%20people%20behi
nd%20bars [https://perma.cc/XK5S-KR36] (“The Bureau of Justice Statistics reckons
that the United States spends more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3
million people behind bars.”).
282 The outcome for prosecutors who overcharge may thus be similar to the outcome
of prosecutors who initially recommend no punishment.
283 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1887).
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B. Guidelines and Standards
This wide variability in prosecutor decisions is consistent with a lack
of meaningful supervision or guidance within prosecutor charging.
Prosecutors’ offices have been called “black boxes” for the lack of
transparency about how charging decisions are made, but our study
sheds light.284 Our data show the general unimportance of supervisors
and office guidelines to prosecutors making charging decisions. In our
survey, nearly three-quarters of prosecutors reported that they decided
alone; their supervisors provided no direction into the initial charging
decisions. Although somewhat more than half of respondents said they
typically relied on mandatory or precatory guidelines, nearly half
indicated that they had no such direction. For those respondents who
did have direction, their guidelines often afforded them significant
discretion to deviate or were only an internal office standard such as
“do justice.” And although some prosecutors reported having charging
manuals or grids, many prosecutors reported that guidelines or
standards were not in writing. And some noted that their guidelines and
standards were “proprietary,” which raises questions about
transparency. These findings suggest avenues for reform, both within
prosecutors’ offices and beyond.
A first step may be to simply require prosecutors to note their reasons
for making discretionary decisions.285 Richard Frase argued that this
approach could be successful as “reasons evolve into factors, and factors
evolve into rules.”286 Frase goes on to explain that “the use of written
reasons for prosecution decisions, which are routinely reviewed by
supervising attorneys, seems the minimum requirement for effective
control of prosecution decisions.”287 Judge Stephanos Bibas has also
claimed that “[s]imply having to explain and justify one’s decisions
disciplines prosecutors, much as writing reasoned decisions disciplines
judges.”288 Prosecutors’ offices might consider requiring prosecutors to
articulate the reasons for the charges they impose, with internal
quarterly or bi-annual review of decisions to determine whether they
match the objectives of the office.
Overall, our data demonstrate — as theorized — that individual
prosecutors have the utmost discretion to charge defendants as they see
fit. We see stark severity in sanctioning some defendants, but this study
284
285
286
287
288

See Miller & Wright, supra note 6.
See Frase, supra note 129, at 292-96.
Id. at 294.
Id.
Bibas, supra note 14, at 1006.
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also demonstrates that for the same crime, defendants receive largely
varying and harsh or lenient sentences, depending on the prosecutor
they interact with. Structural changes must be made if more consistency
and decreased severity are desired in prosecutorial charging.289
C. Factors Relevant to Decision Making
Our study also highlights factors relevant to prosecutor decision
making. When presented with a list of factors important to make a
charging decision, respondents unsurprisingly reported needing to
know about the harm to persons and property, the number and age of
victims, the criminal history of the offender, and the presence and use
of weapons. Several also reported needing the victim’s input and
information from witnesses, a finding that was also present in their
responses to the vignette. Knowing whether the offender had mental
health or substance abuse issues was also important to many
prosecutors, although this was clearer in their responses to the vignette
than in response to the survey question. It was unclear whether
knowing about drug use was important in charging for purposes of
greater leniency, more severe charges, or for diversionary purposes.
Finally, while very few reported needing to know about the offender’s
education or job to make a charging decision, the qualitative responses
to the vignette demonstrate that many prosecutors do consider the
offender’s socioeconomic status when deciding whether a fine or a term
of confinement is important. It is important to acknowledge that while
prosecutors claim that these factors are the most important, it is unclear
that that is the case. Prosecutors could be making subconscious
decisions based on factors in our vignette that they are unaware
influenced them.290 However, having a list of factors important to the
majority of prosecutors provides an important insight into the black box
of prosecutor discretion. We hope it will spark future research on the
factors considered by prosecutors in charging decisions.

289 See Barkow, supra note 4, at 1388 (“We need structural changes to do more than
chip away at the edge of mass incarceration.”); see also Baughman, supra note 13, at
1139 (“Rather than trying to address the individual failing branches . . . instituting
subconstitutional checks—stopgaps adopted by the three branches of government to
effectuate the rights in the Constitution when the system is stalled in dysfunction—
could create meaningful change.”).
290 See generally LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND
RULES YOUR BEHAVIOR (2012) (demonstrating the influential role of the subconscious).
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D. Limitations
As with any empirical study, our study has several limitations. First,
while our study is national in scope, it is not representative. That is, we
recruited respondents from every region in the United States, but the
sample does not represent prosecutors in the U.S. For example, we have
an overrepresentation of prosecutors in the Mountain region in our
study (likely because two of the three authors were professors at
universities in the Mountain region at the time the study was
conducted). We also had a relatively low response rate of twelve
percent, and there may be significant differences between respondents
and nonrespondents in how they make decisions and use discretion.
Moreover, respondents were not required to answer all of the survey
questions or write in responses when prompted. Thus, there may be
differences within the sample between respondents who offered
additional information and respondents who did not.
Additionally, we designed the study to be short and include just a few
questions. The study’s primary objective was to test the effects of race
and class on prosecutor decision making in a vignette-based
experiment,291 and a few survey questions were added to obtain more
information about prosecutor decision making generally. The responses
to the open-ended questions offered an opportunity to acquire further
insight into prosecutor decision making but cannot provide the rich
data that a semi-structured interview with prosecutors would. With
respect to the qualitative analysis, however, our sample size is very
large, and so while there is not the depth of typical qualitative studies,
there is significant breadth. We were thus able to quantify some of the
qualitative data.
It is likely, however, that our study underestimates the importance of
some of the themes we identified in the qualitative analysis. For
example, we only asked respondents to recommend a monetary penalty
or term of confinement, and did not ask them whether they would
recommend mental health treatment. While many respondents brought
up mental health concerns, it is likely that more prosecutors would
recommend treatment if we had explicitly asked them to reflect on this.
Furthermore, we only provided one hypothetical crime to
prosecutors, and it was relatively minor. Prosecutors see a wide range
of criminal activity, including severe criminal activity, and so the
vignette results may not be applicable to other types of crime. Future
research may want to present prosecutors with multiple different
crimes.
291

Robertson et al., supra note 118, at 820-22.
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In brief, our study should be understood as exploratory. The results
presented in this Article can give rise to hypotheses to be tested in future
quantitative studies or to develop questions to be used in in-depth
qualitative interviews.
CONCLUSION
Much remains unknown about how prosecutors make decisions. Our
national study was designed to illuminate the role of discretion in
prosecutor decision making as well as the effects of such discretion. Our
study best tracks what prosecutors wish they could charge defendants
with when resource constraints are removed, which provides insight
into the mind of prosecutors practicing in various jurisdictions across
the country. As seen from the responses to the vignette we provided,
different prosecutors evaluating the same case recommend vastly
different charges and punitive sanctions. Additionally, we described a
relatively minor crime, but a subset of respondents recommended harsh
sanctions. This may be due, in part, to the absence of internal or
national guidelines prosecutors report needing to follow. The findings
from our exploratory study provide a starting point for future research
assessing the variability and severity of prosecutors’ decisions, as well
as the role of standards and guidelines in constraining discretion.
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